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The Shape of Things

COINCIDENT WITH THE RUSSIAN SWEEP AND ON the eve of the Big Three meeting, it is reported that our fliers are beginning to shower the Germans with pamphlets spelling out the meaning of "unconditional surrender." There is no naming terms, but a distinction is clearly drawn between "individual Germans who had nothing to do with the crimes committed by the war criminals" and the war criminals themselves. "It is the wish of the Allies," say the pamphlets, "to give the German people the possibility for normal peaceful development as members of the European family of nations."

*

BUT SUCH IS NOT THE WISH OF ADOLF HITLER. In his Third Reich anniversary speech Hitler denounced the false promise of the decadent democracies, pointed a trembling finger at "the horrid fate that is now taking shape in the east," and exhorted his war-harrowed people to strengthen the heart and steel the nerves "in the holy determination to wield the sword . . . until final victory crowns our efforts." He pictured the menacing wave of "Jewish Asiatic Bolshevism," which unless checked by superhuman effort would engulf not only Germany but the whole European continent and England as well. Perhaps Hitler was directing his remarks not only to the Berliners watching the brightening glare in the eastern skies and the refugees crowding the roads from Breslau and Stettin. Perhaps he was also thinking of more isolated Russophobes gazing out across the broad expanses of Lake Michigan and a few others with a view of the Potomac. The Vansittartites must have had some satisfaction in seeing the frenzied captain trying to herd the whole German shipload—passengers and Nazi crew—into a single leaky lifeboat: now it is salvation or damnation for all.

*

WILL THIS RADICAL PAN-GERMANISM BE ANY more convincing when urged by the fanatic of Berchtesgaden than when argued more suavely by the English lord or his American counterparts? The German mass held together by propaganda, terror, war, and desperation is beginning to separate itself out into constituent parts. There is probably toughness yet in morale. There is certainly fighting strength which will yet be demonstrated on all fronts. But the cracks are beginning to appear. The craven are beginning to look for a hiding place—twice Hitler spoke of the cowards and the infamous ones. The foreign workers, such as the Russians in Oppeln, carry on more effective sabotage. The renewed activity of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow and of its counterpart in France is undoubtedly having an influence in encouraging Germans who have never been

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sympathetic with the Nazis. Prisoners report that even the stout-hearted Wehrmacht fighters have lost all hope of matching the increasing odds against them. The iron-disciplined fanatics of the S. S. will hold the longest. But even their nerve will crack when they find that the desperation and hatred born of fear in the hearts of the German people is no longer directed toward the enemy "from the steppes of Asia" but towards their own leaders who have led them through twelve years of tinsel glory and hopeless suffering into this ghoulish twilight. The funeral march of *Götterdämmerung* has begun.

✶

THERE MUST BE NO COMPROMISE IN OUR STAND on the punishment of war criminals. Already two good men have been lost to the United Nations War Crimes Commission because they insisted that neither the political status of the criminal nor the nationality of his victims should protect him from justice. If the hundreds of thousands of helpless German Jews—men, women, and little children—and the courageous anti-Nazi Germans who have fallen victim to Nazi torture and cruelty are not avenged, then one main objective of this war will remain unfulfilled. There has been a sinister tendency on the part of both the State Department and the British Foreign Office to eliminate from the war its ideological essence and reduce it to a mere clash of military powers. Under such an interpretation the sadists who carried through the shocking brutalities in Poland will be run to earth but the master minds who designed the crime of Nazism itself will go free. If this is a peoples' war and not just a war of states and governments, now is the time for the people to speak. Their pressure has already forced statements from Richard K. Law for the Foreign Office and Joseph Grew for the State Department, although it has not put back on the War Crimes Commission Sir Cecil Hurst and Herbert C. Pell. The pressure of the people must continue to act on and through their representatives and their governments, and must even be felt at the Big Three conference. The danger of leniency with Nazis is revealed in the warning article of Alfred Kantorowicz in the present issue. As a first step to a free world the forgers and perpetrators of Nazi crimes must be brought to justice.

✶

THE CURRENT CONDITION OF ITALY IS A POOR advertisement for Anglo-American statesmanship. Not only are cold, hunger, and disease rampant, but reports from all parts of the liberated area speak of a wave of crime and juvenile delinquency. Herbert L. Matthews has recently cabled the New York *Times* from Sicily: "Eighteen months after its liberation this island is half-starved, wretched, and rebellious, a prey to grave civil disorders." According to this source, the troubles range from brigandage to draft riots to "virtual insurrections." An uprising in Ragusa and Agrigento provinces early this year ended with at least thirty-six dead and eighty-five wounded. Reports like this remind us that the necessity for preventing anarchy was one excuse for following the principle of continuity in Italy, for upholding the Royal House, and for maintaining in office local Fascist functionaries unless their reputations were especially malodorous. The promises of law and order must now seem as ironical to the Italians as the promises of food.

IN SICILY ONE CAUSE OF UNREST AND POSSIBLY a cause of disorder is the separatist movement, whose leaders are seeking to have the island made an independent, sovereign state, after which they would be willing to federate with Italy. Mr. Matthews reports that this movement cuts across all party lines. Its supporters claim that ever since the Risorgimento they have been exploited and neglected by the government at Rome, which has hindered industrial development and done little or nothing to relieve agricultural distress. However, it is noteworthy that the "financial backbone of separatism and its chief leadership" are supplied by the big landlords. Since one of the most vital needs of Sicily is a subdivision of the big estates, this group may well be moved by the fear that some future left-wing Italian government will move to expropriate them, along with the landlords of the mainland. With "independence" the island would almost inevitably come under British influence, and British governments are notoriously tender of landed interests. Mr. Matthews does not mention this point or, perhaps because of the censorship, the strongly held belief of many Italians that the British have given aid and encouragement to the separatists. But the analogy he draws between the separatists and the Moslem League in India, with its demand for Pakistan, is suggestive.

✶

THE LIBERATION OF MANILA HAS SYMBOLIC AS well as military importance. It is the first great city recaptured from the Japanese, and the enthusiastic welcome given to our forces is good evidence that politically our Eastern enemy has been building on sand. Strategically, the taking of Manila cuts the Japanese garrison in two and opens up the possibility of a return of the American navy to the Cavite base, though this move may be delayed by a Japanese death-stand on Corregidor. But in any case American possession of the major Luzon airfield virtually completes the isolation of the vast Japanese holdings in the South Pacific. Although the enemy is attempting to counterbalance the loss of sea communications by obtaining a land route across China, his possession of a land link between Canton and Hankow by no means assures a dependable system of communication. A railway still has to be built; and even if it can be completed before an American landing on the China coast it will be subject to constant attack by the Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese guerrillas. Meanwhile, the opening of the Ledo-Burma road promises to have an immediate effect in strengthening Chinese resistance and in making it possible to build up a stronger American air force. Most encouraging of all is the report of a projected reorganization of the Chinese army along lines that have long been advocated by General Stilwell and other American military authorities. Under the plan one-third of the ragged, ill-nourished conscript army is to be demobilized; the rest is to be reorganized and given a considerable increase in pay. This will have the triple advantage of increasing the number of men available for food production and war work, reducing by some millions the number who must be fed by the government, and increasing the efficiency of the remaining Chinese troops. The significance of this move is best expressed in General Stilwell's own words when he declared that "the Chinese soldier, if fed, clothed, and trained, is as good a soldier as anyone can ask for."

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STEPS FOR STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE International Labor Organization in the post-war period received top priority at the meeting of its Governing Board which has just terminated in London. A constitutional change was adopted which will permit the I. L. O., formerly linked loosely with the League of Nations, to cooperate closely with the new security organization provided for at Dumbarton Oaks while retaining its present functions. After a bitter dispute in which the employer delegates were overruled, the Governing Board voted to establish seven international industrial committees on a tripartite basis, with government as well as employer and worker representatives. These industrial committees are intended to serve as international collective-bargaining agencies which will stabilize wages and working conditions in the basic industries. A foretaste of the problem of dealing with the defeated countries was provided when the representatives of France and Yugoslavia successfully opposed Italy's petition for readmission into the I. L. O. A plea that Russia be invited once again to participate in the organization was also sidetracked. Yet it is evident that if effective international labor standards are to be created and enforced, all nations, particularly the low-standard ones, must be included.

*

OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS SHOW AN INFINITE capacity for tying themselves up into legalistic knots in dealing with the enemy, whether it be in connection with punishing war crimes or the handling of alien property. The Department of Justice has been persuaded by the Office of the Alien Property Custodian to pay almost $700,000 to a group of former I. G. Farben employees in this country rather than contest their suits for recovery of stock seized after Pearl Harbor. The stock was acquired either just before or just after the outbreak of the European war under circumstances designed to keep I. G. Farben subsidiaries in this country in hands friendly to the Germans. Our Washington editor, I. F. Stone, in an article called Fumbling with I. G. Farben, recently called attention to this situation and to the unusual career of one Ernest K. Halbach, president of General Dyestuffs when it was exclusive sales agent in this country for I. G. Farben and securely under German control. Halbach is under indictment for conspiracy with I. G. Farben and his bank accounts are blocked by the Treasury, but he has been drawing $82,000 a year as "consultant" to his old company since the Alien Property Custodian took it over, and he will now be paid $557,550 for the stock taken from him after the war began. The government's decision to settle rather than fight seems all the stranger since in the only one of these I. G. Farben subsidiary cases to reach the courts the government won the first round.

*

REPEAL OF THE POLL TAX IN GEORGIA RANKS as one of the most encouraging developments in recent weeks on the domestic front. It is an event, however, which can be interpreted two ways. Conservatives are already pointing to the repeal as conclusive evidence that the South will handle the problem satisfactorily if it is not subjected to pressure by "outside agitators." Yet the fact remains that Georgia's action came at a time when the pressure for federal legislation outlawing the poll tax is greater than it has been at any other period since the Civil War. No one is likely to insist on federal legislation if all the poll-tax states will voluntarily rescind their discriminatory restrictions on voting. But as these states have had many years in which to abolish their restrictions by their own initiative and have failed to act, it would seem obvious that greater pressure is necessary. The need for a federal law is further pointed up by the situation in Tennessee, where a bill outlawing the tax was invalidated by the state Supreme Court and the legislature has refused to pass a new bill designed to by-pass the objections of the court.

A New Foreign Policy?

RUSHING across Europe, the comet-like Harry Hopkins left a glittering wake of speculation before he vanished behind the overcast of censorship which hides the deliberations of the Big Three. Possibly before this issue of *The Nation* appears, that overcast will be lifted and an expectant world given some inkling of the agenda and conclusions of the conference. Meanwhile, it may be instructive to examine some clues to the nature of the program which the President is laying before Churchill and Stalin.

From Washington, London, Paris, and Rome have come reports which suggest a new and firmer American policy in Europe. We have, if these reports are to be trusted, abandoned the idea that war can be conducted purely on a military level with all political questions thrust aside until the guns stop firing. In an interview in Rome, Mr. Hopkins is reported to have said that the Administration now realized that conditions in the liberated countries could not be left out of account in military planning. He added as a personal opinion—but would he have voiced it if it was at variance with those of his chief?—that the swing to the left among the European nations was to the interests of the United States, provided it did not go to the extremes of totalitarianism. In an account of the same interview Anne O'Hare McCormick quoted Hopkins as saying that American motives for participation in European affairs were not so closely connected with immediate national interests as were those of the British and the Russians, illustrated by their concern for security in the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe respectively. Our concern, rather, was for "a good peace" based on the ideals for which we had fought.

In the view of some observers, all this means that President Roosevelt, strengthened by the assurance of Senatorial support, is going to talk turkey to both Churchill and Stalin. He will tell them that British and Russian demands for security must not stand in the way of the kind of settlement that will give the United States security against the outbreak of a third world war in Europe. Moreover, it is believed, he will emphasize the fact that Americans are not taking part in the liberation of Europe in order to enthrone new dictatorships and will insist on joint machinery to insure that the Italians and the Greeks actually have a free hand to choose their future form of government. According to Jon Kimche of Reuters, the message the President sent Churchill via Hopkins contained a flat veto of all "totalitarian governments in Europe whether of right or left," and included in this description the present setups in Lublin and Belgrade.

We confess to some skepticism about these reports in the

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absence of corroborative evidence. Surely, if the Administration were going to take a rigid stand against totalitarianism, it would not overlook Franco. Moreover, the deference our diplomats, official and unofficial, show to the Vatican does not seem to us to be consistent with a strong stand for European democracy. It is true that the Pope has recently spoken favorably of democracy, but his notion of democracy is a decidedly esoteric one, and we cannot forget that he has condemned only those fascist regimes which have actively interfered with the political or property rights of the church. Yet the Administration continues to treat the Vatican as an important temporal power; indeed, as one of the United Nations, not, perhaps, quite on a par with the Big Three but as worthy of consultation as France.

Assuming, however, that these suspicions are groundless, what are the arguments and the bargaining counters that Mr. Roosevelt can employ in overcoming the fears and ambitions of Britain and Russia? Reports from several quarters declare that he proposes to use America's economic position as a club. Russia and Britain, not to mention smaller European powers, will need generous American credit for reconstruction. This country, the President may say, is prepared to offer the necessary loans but only if the political settlement of Europe is such as to minimize the risks. How effective this argument will prove we do not know. Historically, the Soviets have always looked askance at loans with political strings attached, and the British are already torn between the desire to speed reconstruction and the fear of economic dependence on the United States.

In these circumstances the second means of persuasion, which Mr. Roosevelt is supposed to have up his sleeve, may prove more effective. This is support for the principle of a tough peace for Germany coupled with a definite American undertaking to enforce it by means of the Vandenberg or some similar plan. Reports from several different sources agree that the so-called Morgenthau plan, with some modifications, represents the policy for post-war Germany which the President has adopted. It would include the partial dismemberment of the Reich, with Silesia going to Poland and control of the Ruhr and Rhineland passing to some kind of international commission. These steps alone would deprive Germany of a major part of its heavy industry, but its war-making capacity would be further reduced by the physical removal of chemical, machine, and other plants to neighboring countries which have suffered from German occupation. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, it is said, is ready to back the use of German labor on a large scale to make good the devastation in countries invaded by Germany.

On paper such schemes have the quality of rough justice. Germany's victims have the right to demand that their economic needs take precedence, that their standard of living should be restored to normal before that of the Germans. But while giving the utmost consideration to their claims we have to take into account the ultimate consequences of such drastic peace terms. Could a Germany deprived of its wealthiest provinces and strictly limited in its economic activities exist at all as a political entity? Could any kind of native government be found for it, and, if not, what kind of military rule would the Allies be able to provide and for how long? These are but a few of the questions to which the Morgenthau plan gives rise. Perhaps the Big Three will provide some answers. Until we have them, the plan appears as an impractical but far from harmless blueprint.

Still Too Much Brass Hat

WE HOPE the Senate Military Affairs Committee will not let itself be stampeded into passing the May-Bailey work-or-fight bill without full hearings, and we hope that the committee will amend the bill to increase the powers of the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Mobilization. The angry statement made by Senator Edwin C. Johnson (Democrat, Colorado) serves to call attention to the fact that the War Department still seems intent on going its own high-handed way in the handling of man-power. *The Nation* has called attention time and again to the fact that man-power cannot be isolated from the rest of the war-production picture and that much current difficulty goes back to the stubborn unwillingness of army-navy procurement services to cooperate with civilian war agencies in a coordinated program. Judging from Senator Johnson's outburst, that attitude of mind still dominates the War Department.

The House turned down the Voorhis bill to handle labor shortages by giving greater power to the War Manpower Commission. This approach seems to us the one best designed to combine compulsion with efficiency. But the work-or-fight measure as passed by the House did provide that the basic certificates for compulsory mobilization of man-power should be issued by the Director of War Mobilization "after consultation with the appropriate representatives of management, labor, agriculture, and government" and after finding that voluntary recruitment had failed. This means full utilization of the democratic and cooperative community mechanisms already established by the War Manpower Commission in war production centers. And this provision was based on the written recommendation agreed upon by the War Department and the other agencies concerned with man-power.

Senator Johnson declared that after the committee had accepted this recommendation by a vote of seven-to-two, a high War Department spokesman privately telephoned several members of the Senate committee to urge them to substitute a "compromise amendment" placing greater powers in the hands of Selective Service boards and relegating the Office of War Mobilization and other civilian agencies to mere advisory roles. Johnson called this "dirty double-crossing," which it is, if true, and the committee has held up the bill. It seems to be clear to everyone but the brass hats that the local draft boards are not equipped to handle the complicated and delicate problems of labor mobilization; they have made a mess of the simpler problem of occupational deferments. The army-navy procurement services prefer to leave compulsory powers with Selective Service because it is under military influence, if not domination, and has no authority to go into related phases of the war-production problem.

To explain what we mean we call attention to the order issued on January 26 by J. A. Krug, chairman of the War Production Board. This order seems to embody the first agreement among army, navy, War Manpower Commission, and War Production Board on a very old, obvious, and ele-

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mentary problem. The problem is for the army and navy not to place new contracts in tight labor areas without regard to the man-power and facilities available. Some time ago Production Urgency Committees were set up to establish employment ceilings and labor priorities designed to channel labor into places where it was most urgently needed and to bring some order into the placing of new contracts. The January 26 order provides that no new prime contracts are to be placed in tight labor areas without the approval of the Production Urgency Committee when the new contracts would require an increase in labor above the Manpower Commission ceilings. Such an order should have been made months ago.

The Nation has long urged Congress to adopt some such comprehensive measure for coordinating industrial and labor mobilization as was embodied in the Kilgore-Pepper-Tolan bill. It believes some measures of compulsion in the labor field necessary, but it believes these will prove most effective in the framework of a planned war economy. The army-navy procurement services have always preferred the hit-or-miss approach, have always resented any suggestion that they cooperate with civilian war-production agencies. Senator Johnson's outburst indicates that this is still the prevailing spirit. If a work-or-fight law is enforced in that way, on the premise that war-production tangles can be solved merely by ordering workers around, we are headed for trouble. The Senate Military Affairs Committee can prevent that trouble by passing a work-or-fight bill which would operate within the framework of the Office of War Mobilization and not at the mercy of impatient military martinets and uninformed and subservient local draft boards.

Zhukov's Gamble

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

THE Russian advance continued to make extraordinary progress last week. Having covered three hundred miles in three weeks, the Red Army brought the war almost to Berlin—and Germany a big step closer to defeat.

German resistance hardened during the week, especially on the southern flank of the great Russian salient pointed toward Berlin, where Marshal Konev made but little progress into Silesia. It hardened less successfully on the northern flank, where Marshal Rokossovsky occupied most of East Prussia and pushed a shoulder into Pomerania, cutting the Danzig-Berlin communication lines. In the central and most threatened sector of the front German resistance settled itself only on the approaches to Küstrin and Frankfurt, after Marshal Zhukov had rolled up near the Oder on a twenty-mile front. As I write (Monday), late reports indicate that the Russians are drawing up around these two traditional eastern bastions of the German capital, which form with the Oder the last major obstacles short of the city itself. Berlin is less than forty miles away.

The last forty miles may well prove to be the hardest. The two fortress cities and the river line are not the only things standing between Zhukov and the greatest single prize of the war against Germany. It must be assumed that the German high command has gathered a fairly respectable force for this desperate and vital battle for Berlin, by moving up the last of Germany's strategic reserves, some divisions from the western front, and newly trained units of the *Volkssturm,* whose members can fire machine-guns from pillboxes despite their late and hasty indoctrination. It must also be presumed that something more than a vacuum lies between the Oder and Berlin. It has been apparent for two years, ever since Stalingrad, that this area would one day have to be defended, and undoubtedly it is laced with tank traps, mine fields, barbed-wire entanglements, and mutually supporting strong points. It is also one of the most heavily built-up areas in the world—which means street-to-street and finally house-to-house fighting, although the flatness of the German plain and the lack of natural obstacles might permit broad flanking sweeps to cut off Berlin's communications.

Perhaps even more important is the present contour line of the Russian front, from Elbing on the Baltic to Katowice in Polish Silesia—an enormous sickle, through which Zhukov's hammer is pounding at Berlin. The shape of the sickle and the position of the hammer, neatly symbolic of Russian power though they may be, are enough to give a traditional staff officer the heeby-jeebies. Against an enemy with any considerable power still at his disposal, Zhukov would obviously be putting his head into a sack. His farthest spearpoint is three hundred miles from its jumping-off place; the base of the Russian salient is some six hundred miles long; the spearpoint is only twenty miles wide, with the sides of the salient sloping in steeply to form this exceptionally narrow and exposed position. The southern slope of the salient follows the general line of the Oder, which may be a barrier to German pressure as well as to Russian crossing; the northern slope follows the less formidable line of the railway from Berlin to Danzig, which can be crossed at will except in so far as the crossing is interdicted by fire from one side or the other.

Into this seeming cul-de-sac Zhukov's supply lines run from the far side of the Vistula, three hundred miles away. The direct line is blocked at a crucial spot by the continued resistance of the German garrison in Poznan, which may come to play as important a part in eastern-front affairs as the hopelessly besieged German garrisons in the French Atlantic ports played in western-front affairs. Whether, in the face of these difficulties, the Russians can continue their already extraordinary supply performance remains to be seen. One would judge not, but one has learned not to apply ordinary judgments to the Red Army.

The hardened resistance at the Oder and the dangerous shape of the Russian line do suggest that Soviet strategy will call for redoubled efforts by Rokossovsky and Konev to relieve Zhukov's exposed and essentially unsound position.

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It would be entirely in keeping with past Soviet strategy for Zhukov to regroup while his friends to right and left rolled up the German flanks, cutting through Pomerania to Stettin and over the southern Oder through German Silesia to Liegnitz and Görlitz.

Whether Soviet strategy follows its traditional pattern or Marshal Zhukov ignores his dangers and drives on to Berlin, it is obvious that the Germans are in the direst straits. Refugees clog the roads from the east, eliciting the tearful remarks of German radio commentators; with what must have been hundreds of thousands of these wretches in the streets, Berlin received its most concentrated bombing of the war on Saturday from the United States Eighth Air Force. Goebbels was reported charged with the defense of Berlin, with Hitler scheduled for the crags of Berchtesgaden. The coldest winter, the greatest fuel and food shortages, the gravest military threat of the war: this is Germany on the twelfth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power. It seems unlikely that the Reich will last thirteen years, much less the thousand promised for it by the megalomaniac corporal.

Wallace: Second Round

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, February 4

MR. ROOSEVELT'S attitude in the battle over the appointment of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce is far from clear. Last Sunday night I was informed by two separate sources in close touch with Wallace and with Senator Pepper, who has been leading the fight for him, that confirmation could be expected within a few days. I was given to understand that a compromise had been reached under which the President would issue an executive order separating the Federal Loan Agency from the Department of Commerce. It was believed that this would satisfy enough of Wallace's opponents to obtain a majority for him, as I feel sure it would have at that time. The cheerful confidence of the Wallace forces began to evaporate when Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday passed with no such message from the President.

On Thursday morning the Washington *Post* reported that as the Senate "squared off for round one, Barkley lacked any word from the President." The *Post* said it had been "four days since he [Barkley] advised Mr. Roosevelt to separate loan functions from the Commerce Department by executive order, and to green-light the George bill doing the same thing." When the Senate met that day, it was only one vote that prevented passage of the Bailey motion to take up the Wallace appointment before the George bill. I have encountered no one who does not think Wallace would have been beaten if the nomination had come before the Senate ahead of the bill. The forty-three-to-forty-one vote against the Bailey motion was an even narrower escape than it seemed to be. Senator Taft had voted "nay" only so that he could move for reconsideration, and on that motion Wallace might have been defeated. Fortunately Senator Bailey, with the help of Vice-President Truman, obtained the floor, shutting off the Taft motion to reconsider and moving instead to postpone the consideration of the Wallace nomination for thirty days.

Senator Barkley not only asked a postponement of thirty days but agreed that he would move for an extension if the George bill had not been passed by the House and signed by the President at that time. He thus pledged himself to hold up any vote on the Wallace nomination until the George bill was law. It was only in the course of speaking on this motion to postpone that he finally brought forward the long-awaited message from the President. The majority leader said he had "just received" it, "through the White House," and later indicated to the press that he meant this literally and had not had the message when the Bailey motion came up.

It has been a favorite last-ditch device of the President's to head off legislation he did not want with an executive order designed to take the steam out of the forces behind the legislation. This was the tactic he used to prevent passage of the Kilgore-Pepper-Tolan bill for an Office of War Mobilization two years ago. But in this case there was no executive order, only a promise to approve the George bill when passed. The message was not direct from the President but in a letter from Judge Samuel M. Rosenman to Senator Barkley. Had the message come earlier, it might have been used to win immediate confirmation of Wallace on the President's promise to approve the George bill. Timed as it was, the message was of little value, since Barkley had to agree to postpone a vote on the nomination until the George bill had actually been passed and signed. This, as is already becoming clear, only gives Wallace's enemies more time in which to work out new ways to block his confirmation.

Censorship regulations designed to protect the person of the President prevent full discussion of the message. "As we all know," Senator Barkley said, "the President is on the verge of a very important conference." The foreign press and radio report that he is abroad. It may be that some difficulty in communication, whether technical or precautionary, explains the belated character of the President's message. This might conceivably have something to do with the absence of the expected executive order. But the incident stirs misgivings, coming as it does after Mr. Roosevelt's rather cheap letter to Jesse Jones, with its ignoble attempt to duck responsibility by implying that he "had to do something for Henry." The parallelism with the Chicago brush-off is strong. I hope it is unjustified.

In my opinion, and I hope I am wrong, it will be harder to obtain Wallace's confirmation after the President returns from that "important conference" to which Senator Barkley referred. An "important conference" at this time is likely to result in some long-postponed territorial settlements in the East, and if Mr. Roosevelt has to win conservative support for a new Polish boundary, he will be in no position politically to ram the Wallace appointment down the Senate's throat.

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Conversely, there will be new arguments for withdrawing the nomination in the hands of Wallace's enemies and rivals in the Administration.

The anti-Wallace forces are shifting their strategy. The George bill, which was put forward to hurt Wallace, proved to be based on an overestimate of his strength in the Senate. It is the only thing which can now save him. As Arthur Krock observed sadly in the New York *Times* today, "the only way to have assured Mr. Wallace's rejection was to have made his full appointment an open-and-shut question. . . . Though this knowledge came soon, it came too late to be applied by the all-out opposition." But some minds run in similar channels, and even as those words were being written by Krock, Rankin of Mississippi was announcing that he would move to send the George bill back to committee in the House and to keep it there until the Senate had voted on the Wallace nomination. This means a fight in the House between Rankin, who hates Wallace, and Rayburn, who hates Jesse Jones. And it will be a fight between two Southern Democrats for the votes of Southern Democrats. If Rankin wins, he will be the boss of the House, leader of a victorious rightist coalition.

With the Wallace nomination, progressives have embarked on a political battle equaled in importance only by that for a stable United Nations peace. More is at stake here than who shall be Secretary of Commerce or what shall happen to Henry A. Wallace. The stability and prosperity and political health of post-war America hang upon the outcome, for this is but the beginning of the long fight for full employment. That fight may easily be lost and only with difficulty won. Even if Wallace is confirmed—and he can be—the victory will only be a starter. The next step will be the choice of a Federal Loan Administrator, and after that we may expect every concrete proposal to stir bitter opposition in Congress.

It seems obvious that a lengthy political campaign of this kind cannot finally be won by last-minute frantic flurries, a wave of telegrams, and a burst of lobbying. It can only be won if the leaders of the C. I. O.-P. A. C. and N. C.-P. A. C. are determined to carry on their political activities on a more than hand-to-mouth basis, if they are prepared to get out to the grass roots and through patient organizational and educational work, without frenzy or rancor, explain the meaning of full employment and the methods by which it may be obtained. Victory will not be won by blaming "reaction" or Rankin, or by election threats against Congressmen. The basis of Wallace's difficulties in Congress is the fact that the full-employment issue is as yet imperfectly understood by the people of this country. When they understand the issue and are aroused enough to demand action on it, Congress will be no obstacle. There lies the P. A. C.'s job and ours.

Britain's Economic Dunkirk

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

TO WHAT extent has Britain's economic structure been undermined by the war? Will the price of victory prove to be permanent impoverishment? Has John Bull, as some allege, been bankrupted by his efforts, and, if so, what sort of composition will he attempt to make with his creditors? By lifting the statistical blackout the White Paper on the war effort of the United Kingdom has made possible at least a partial answer to those questions.

Some American commentators have asserted that Britain will be in a better economic position than the United States after the war because the growth in its national debt has been relatively smaller. But the size of a country's internal debt has no bearing on its capacity to produce real wealth; that is only affected to the extent that war destroys or consumes the actual means of production. For modern war is necessarily on a pay-as-you-go basis. Today's battles cannot be fought with weapons produced tomorrow. Consequently the economic demands of war can only be met by increasing current production and reducing current consumption, in other words, by sweat and abstinence now. No draft on future consumption is involved apart from what is necessary to replace expended capital assets. And so far as this country is concerned, it appears that, on balance, its wealth-producing equipment has increased during the war, and its ability to supply the needs of its citizens is greater than before.

All European countries have, on the other hand, suffered some degree of capital deterioration. The most obvious form of such wastage is the sheer destruction incidental to battle or resulting from deliberate attempts to deny facilities to the enemy—scorched-earth tactics. Less obvious, but in the case of Britain not less important, is what is called "disinvestment," which arises from failure to maintain existing capital assets at full efficiency because the necessary man-power and materials have been diverted to war production. Another form of disinvestment is the liquidation of foreign assets in order to pay for urgently needed war goods from overseas.

The destructiveness of modern warfare is beyond description; in a country which has the misfortune to become a stubbornly contested battlefield, it can be almost total. I have been told on good authority that in Italy, from the toe of the peninsula to the River Arno, only 6 per cent of the capital equipment, including railroads and public utilities, remains intact. In large parts of Russia the devastation is even more complete; homes, farms, factories, power stations, schools lie in ruins after being burned and blasted, first by the retreating Red Army and again by the retreating Germans. In Holland the very soil is being washed away or poisoned with salt water by the strategic flooding practiced by friend and foe. The loss of the means of production in these and other countries obviously implies a fall in the standard of living to a subsistence level. For a long time their peoples will have to devote all their surplus energies to the task of rebuilding their productive and social capital; they will be forced to choose bridges before butter.

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Britain has been a battlefield throughout a large part of the war and remains a battlefield today, but the physical damage it has suffered, while severe, is not on this horrifying scale. The White Paper provides the information that up to September 30, 1944, 202,000 houses had been destroyed or damaged beyond repair, 255,000 more had been rendered uninhabitable, and 4,073,000 were damaged but remained inhabitable. If we estimate the cost of reconstruction at an average of $2,000 for houses in the first category, at $800 for those in the second, and at $200 for those in the third, we arrive at a total bill for residential property of $1,420,000,000. No details at all are available of the damage received in air raids by industrial and commercial property, churches, public buildings, schools, hospitals, and so on, but in London alone it is clearly very considerable. Making a rough guess, I would say that a figure of $600,000,000 for replacement costs would be far from excessive, bringing the over-all total to around $2,000,000,000.

During the war the only maintenance and repair work that can be carried out in Britain on buildings, machinery, and other forms of capital equipment is that which is essential to the war effort. Consequently a large amount of normal depreciation is not being made good, and the plant of the country, as a whole, has deteriorated. In 1940 this disinvestment was more than counterbalanced by new investment, but according to the White Paper, in the three years 1941 to 1943 there was a net disinvestment of almost $1,600,000,000. Assuming a figure for 1944 equal to that of 1943, a total of $2,100,000,000 would be reached. Unfortunately, it is not clear just what kinds of capital are covered by the estimate in the White Paper which refers to "private net disinvestment at home." This may or may not include depreciation suffered by residential property. Certainly it does not include what may be called intangible disinvestment.

The most important form of this is, perhaps, loss of education due to the war, since trained intelligence is any country's primary capital equipment. The necessity for evacuating millions of children from the cities has led to disruption of the primary schools; the urgent need of man-power has sent numbers of young people of teen age into the factories, depriving them of secondary education; service in the armed forces has prevented or interrupted higher education for many. To the extent that these losses are made good, a draft on future production is necessarily involved, since these young people must be maintained by the working population while they acquire the skills and knowledge without which their future usefulness to the community will be impaired.

Leaving aside such immeasurable losses, we have as the result of enemy action and internal disinvestment an estimated total reduction in capital of some $4,100,000,000 or a little more than £1,000,000,000. Imposing as this sum is, it is not too formidable in relation to the British national income, which in 1943 amounted to £8,172,000,000. If Britain maintains full employment after the war, the whole loss can be made good within a few years, allowing at the same time for a considerable improvement on the standard of consumption prevailing during the war. According to Sir William Beveridge, the full utilization of British resources in 1938, by raising the employment rate from the actual 87.1 per cent to the 97 per cent which he believes possible, would have added £500,000,000 to the national income, or about £650,000,000 in terms of the higher current prices.*

The problem of compensating external disinvestment is much more difficult to tackle since its solution depends in part on the policies of other countries. The income from Britain's Victorian heritage of foreign investments has long played a vital part in the maintenance of its trade balance. These investments were both widely diffused geographically and very diverse in character. They included large amounts of American stocks and bonds, government obligations of the dominions, colonies, and foreign countries, the direct ownership of mines, plantations, and industrial establishments in all parts of the world. Prior to 1914 the interest and profits arising from these assets were still largely being reinvested abroad, but the need for foreign exchange, particularly dollars, in the early years of the First World War caused the liquidation of a part of Britain's foreign holdings. And after the war a falling off in British exports made it necessary to draw on the income from the remainder in order to meet the bill for imported goods. In fact, in the thirties the trade balance could only be maintained in some years by a draft on capital account—that is to say, by external disinvestment.

There was therefore a very close connection between Britain's foreign investments and its standard of living. Without the inflow of income from abroad it would not have been possible to pay for a large part of the foodstuffs and manufactured goods which came to the British consumer from overseas. The British housewife would have found smaller supplies of Argentine and Australian meat in the stores; her family might have had to go without South African and Spanish fruit, Danish bacon, French cheeses. Movie fans would have had to be content with fewer American films, smokers with less tobacco, drinkers with reduced quantities of wine. In some cases the deficiency might have been partially compensated by increased home production, but only at an increased cost. There would have been no way of avoiding a decrease in total consumption and hence a lower standard of living.

Britain's imports (less reexports) in the three pre-war years 1936-38 averaged £866,000,000. They were paid for as follows:

Exports	£478,000,000
Shipping services	105,000,000
Financial services	40,000,000
Income on foreign investments	203,000,000
Deficit	40,000,000
Total	£866,000,000

It will be seen that actual exports of goods covered little more than half the cost of imports: the remainder had to be provided by what is known as "invisible exports."

According to the White Paper, overseas assets amounting to £1,065,000,000 have been sold since the present war started, mainly for the purpose of paying for war materials. As a consequence, it has been estimated that Britain's income from this source has shrunk by at least 50 per cent. A still further reduction may occur as the result of technological changes brought about by the war—say, the permanent displacement of natural rubber, in which much British money has been invested, by synthetics.

* "Full Employment in a Free Society," page 139 (English Edition).

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In addition, Britain has borrowed, apart from Lend-Lease, from countries supplying it with goods and services, such as Argentina, India, Egypt, and Portugal. Unable to make payment by exporting goods of its own manufacture—for which the raw materials and man-power could not be spared—it has given these countries I. O. U.'s to the tune of £2,300,000,000. According to Lord Keynes, by the end of the war the total of these frozen sterling credits is likely to approach £3,000,000,000. Eventually this debt will have to be refunded and liquidated. Let us assume that, provisionally at least, interest and amortization are fixed at no more than 5 per cent per annum. This would mean an additional £150,000,000 annually on the debit side of Britain's international accounts.

On the credit side, as can be noted from the table above, income from shipping is an important item. But this too is expected to diminish in the years immediately after the war. Up to the end of 1943 Britain had lost in the course of the war 2,921 ocean-going vessels of 11,643,000 gross tons out of a pre-war merchant fleet totaling 17,500,000 gross tons. An intensified shipbuilding program plus purchases from abroad has made possible, however, the replacement of a considerable part of this loss; so that by the end of 1943 the tonnage on the United Kingdom and colonial registers was only 29 per cent less than before the war. On the other hand, the enormous growth of the United States merchant fleet suggests increased competition for freights in the immediate post-war years and a probable decrease in Britain's share of the world carrying trade. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to estimate Britain's post-war net income from shipping at only two-thirds of the pre-war figure.

Assuming that pre-war average imports and exports are maintained, we can now construct a tentative post-war international balance sheet for Britain.

Dr.		*Cr.*	
Imports	£ 866,000,000	Exports	£ 478,000,000
Payments to foreign creditors	150,000,000	Shipping services	70,000,000
		Financial services	40,000,000
		Income from foreign investments	100,000,000
			£ 688,000,000
		Deficit	328,000,000
	£1,016,000,000		£1,016,000,000

It is possible that in the transitional period following the end of the war Britain might be willing to meet such a deficit by (a) liquidating part of its remaining foreign assets, or (b) incurring new debts—possibly via the international financial institutions envisaged in the Bretton Woods agreement. But it is certain that such a policy could be safely pursued only for a very limited period. Borrowing abroad for the creation of permanent income-producing assets is one thing; borrowing to pay for current consumption must tip the scales still more heavily against the debtor country and eventually lead to repudiation of the debt.

It follows that unless Britain is able to increase its income from exports and shipping by some 60 per cent, it must effect a drastic reduction in imports—a step which would imply the reorganization of its economy and a definite reduction in its standard of living. In fact, with a limited area of cultivatable land and with rather meager resources in raw materials, apart from coal, it is doubtful whether under these circumstances Britain could continue to support anything like its present population.

Britain, in short, has suffered an economic Dunkirk in the course of the war. Can it recover and, if so, by what means? One thing is clear, recovery will not be automatic. Britain will be forced to budget its diminished resources and to plan its peace economy no less thoroughly than it has planned its war economy. In future articles I propose to discuss the nature of this planning both in its short-term and long-term aspects, and its bearing on American problems.

[*The first of a series of three articles.*]

25 Years Ago in "The Nation"

ONE OF THE FIRST ACTS of the Czechoslovak Republic was to create a Department of Social Welfare. The first report of the Minister, Dr. Karel Winter, issued at the end of December, is an encouraging account of progress and a suggestive indication of things yet to be done.—*February 7, 1920.*

THE LEADERS of the prohibition forces seem to be in a fair way to offset the success which they have recently won by bringing both prohibition and the Eighteenth Amendment into contempt. . . . Such extraordinary rigor of enforcement . . . as is now contemplated is little likely to commend prohibition to thoughtful persons; on the contrary, it is almost certain to bring about a reaction which may go a long way toward nullifying the amendment and the laws under which the amendment is to be carried into effect.—*February 7, 1920.*

"THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE." By J. M. Keynes. . . . This is a very great book. If any answer can be made to the overwhelming indictment of the treaty that it contains, that answer has yet to be published. Mr. Keynes writes with a fulness of knowledge, an incisiveness of judgment, and a penetration into the ultimate causes of economic events that perhaps only half a dozen living economists might hope to rival.—HAROLD J. LASKI, *February 7, 1920.*

AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED, the failure of the United States to enter the League [of Nations] has deprived that organization of much of its importance, and it is unlikely that the League will do much more than mark time until the final decision of this country has been taken.—*February 14, 1920.*

LONDON, JANUARY 20. . . . The Coalition government declines in power, and Labor is the only rallying point of the malcontents. . . . Thus we stand in Great Britain today with a swiftly flowing current of rather indefinite opinion around us—a current, however, which carries the Labor Party far towards Parliamentary power.—J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, *February 28, 1920.*

BOOKS OF THE MONTH: T. S. Eliot, "Poems"; A. F. Kerensky, "The Prelude to Bolshevism"; Thorstein Veblen, "The Place of Science in Modern Civilization."

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The French and the Big Three

BY CHARLES A. MICAUD

A YEAR ago it was fashionable to affirm that France's crushing defeat had forever relegated it to the status of a second-rate power. Since then, however, a series of successes for French diplomacy has been crowned by a military alliance with Russia, and France is now ready to reenter the big league. Its recognition as a world power will have important repercussions on the balance of power within Europe and on the character of the world peace organization.

Two main principles are guiding the foreign policy of the Provisional Government of France: the first is the quest for security, particularly the elimination of the German menace; the other is the reestablishment of France's former power and prestige—the French people are in no mood to play second fiddle, a natural reaction after years of national humiliation.

Keeping in mind these two principles of French diplomacy, we can understand the full meaning of the Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance. First, it guarantees France against a resurgent Germany. The past two decades have proved that collective security is a myth unless enforced by *all* the leading countries; Frenchmen fear that those less directly threatened may again relax their vigilance. Whatever the attitude of Britain and America toward the Germany of 1960, the French want to make certain of an overwhelming superiority on the Continent, for they are convinced that the Germans will behave only if threatened with disaster. Had the Franco-Soviet pact of 1935 been made effective by staff conversations, had the German high command been convinced that the war must be fought on two fronts, France would have escaped its 1940 disaster.

But the present treaty with Russia is more than an instrument of security; it is also an instrument of power politics. Russia's desire to strengthen its own Continental position was France's opportunity to regain its freedom of action. Already disposing of a powerful friend in the East, the French government is encouraging competitive bidding for a valuable friendship. Nor is it surprising to see a still weak nation capitalizing on diplomatic opportunity. De Gaulle has already proved that he is a hard bargainer as well as a passionate nationalist.

This does not mean that France has shut the door on England and America, trusting that the Soviet alliance will give it full security. On his return from Moscow De Gaulle made it clear that his government was now intent upon strengthening the ties with the West. The Continental system would not be complete without the full participation of England: the Triple Entente is still better than a bi-lateral pact with a too powerful partner. Besides, France possesses a large colonial empire whose defense requires close collaboration with Britain and the United States. More important still, the French people are anxious not to sacrifice collective security on a world basis to a system of Continental alliances, which is considered a *pis-aller*. A committee has already been established to reconcile the treaty with Russia with the Dumbarton Oaks projects. This is not an easy task.

Had the Big Three agreed 100 per cent on the coming peace organization, the Franco-Soviet pact would probably not have been signed. The Russians need a friendly voice at the next conference in order to tip the scale in their favor. More precisely, they expect France to back up their claim to a zone of security in Eastern Europe and its corollary, the right of veto at the council of the new League of Nations. The French diplomats—if invited—will be in a difficult position trying to bring about a compromise between the Russian thesis and the American concept of integral collective security. Their position will be complicated by the fact that they want to make the Big Three agree to France's own solution of the German problem. For to them the status of the Rhineland is the keystone not only of France's security on the Continent but of its position as a world power, and is closely related to the broader questions of the balance of power within Europe and the character of the world peace organization. That is why De Gaulle has consistently demanded that France participate in decisions concerning the future of Germany, why he forged his diplomatic weapon at Moscow. "France does not intend to finish the war without the assurance that French forces will be installed permanently from one end of the Rhine to the other," he declared bluntly on January 25. In a New Year's interview with the Paris correspondent of *Free World*, M. Georges Bidault first indorsed Russia's demands concerning the Curzon line, then emphasized his government's position on the Rhineland: "The territories that compose it, and one must add to them the Ruhr, will no longer be governed militarily, economically, administratively by Berlin."

Not only is the Rhine frontier strategically valuable, but the coal of the Saar and Ruhr basins would make France the first industrial and therefore first military power west of Russia. Already disposing of the richest iron-ore deposits in Europe, France would be in a position to build a heavy industry comparable to that of Germany before the war. Its production of steel, the best index of its "power," would be multiplied three times, with a corresponding decrease on the German side. Rather than ask for an outright annexation that would meet serious ethnical and political objections, the French government is likely to urge a special status for the Rhineland, leaving it politically independent but integrated within the French economy. The leading country in the West could then group the smaller nations into a powerful federation. As the hinge in the new Moscow-Paris-London axis, France would hold the balance of power in Europe, England's traditional role.

Admitting that such an ambitious scheme is being entertained by De Gaulle and receives the support of Stalin, still it has little chance of realization against the opposition of America and England. In spite of their desire to strengthen

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France, the two English-speaking powers may well object to this one-sided solution of the German problem. For it would recreate the balance-of-power pattern for Europe without helping England to solve its own economic and strategical dilemma. Faced by the problems of post-war trade, and with insularity no longer an asset, Britain is eager to pool national resources in a Western bloc which would include the autonomous Rhineland.

Not only the statesmen of Belgium and Holland but those of France seemed to look favorably on the British idea of regionalism. De Gaulle alluded to it on several occasions. After the liberation of France his financial adviser, M. Istel, again took up the proposal in a well-documented address given at the Sorbonne. Even the angry reaction to Marshal Smuts's famous speech a year ago could not be interpreted as proof that French nationalism was too strong a barrier to union; De Gaulle's followers objected mostly to the cavalier tone of Smuts's proposal relegating France to the status of a second-rate power. To the Fighting French, then poor relations of their great allies, the advantages of the British plan were obvious. Here was a chance of reestablishing France in a position of prestige and power. Besides, its economic problems after the war would be similar to those of Britain. And to those problems planned economy was hardly a sufficient answer: it could not insure an expanding economy, adequate social security, and higher standards of living to a country tailored on the eighteenth-century pattern. A division of labor with other nations was preferable to former attempts at self-sufficiency, which in practice amounted to a policy of agricultural preferment and an economy of scarcity.

The idea of a Western federation was thus maturing in European minds when, on the eve of their trip to Moscow, De Gaulle and Bidault officially denied that France had any intention of joining an exclusive Western European bloc. Many observers saw in these declarations the *coup de grâce* to the Franco-British regional plan.

It may be questioned, however, whether France, or even Russia, is definitively opposed to a Western European union. Russia's present veto is understandable in terms of its old fear of "capitalist aggression," a fear that dictated its foreign and even its domestic policy between the two world wars. Its unsuccessful attempts to organize collective security against Nazi Germany have not been forgotten, and the Soviet leaders want to make sure that the Munich spirit is dead. On the other hand, Moscow may well prefer to deal with two super-powers of approximately the same strength than with a sprawling Atlantic community in a position to build another *cordon sanitaire* all the way from China to Central Europe. If guaranties are given that the Western bloc is not a rival in arms but a friend, Russia may well agree to the principle of regionalism in the West which it is now sponsoring in the East. In this connection a



PEP TALK TO THE DEAD

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leftist France offers perhaps greater guaranties than Britain, especially in view of Churchill's policy toward Greece, Belgium, and Italy. The Soviet government may want to ascertain that a strong and friendly France will vouch for the foreign policy of the Western federation. But in any case Stalin is not likely to modify his present attitude until the next elections in Britain and in France show which way the wind is turning and until tangible proofs are given of the pro-Russian orientation of the Western democracies.

As for France, its new eastward orientation is no proof that it has definitively abandoned the idea of a partnership with Britain in the West. At Moscow De Gaulle may even have attempted to convince Stalin that the new unit would not be directed against Russia. Rather than playing alone the part of a super-power, France may find it wise to share the burden with Britain. The heroic mood of today is not to last, and the French people will again prefer security to prestige. If the next general elections in Britain and in France confirm the present trend to the left, and if Russia no longer objects to the scheme, the demands for an integrated Western Europe will steadily increase. Those who fear that the proposal of a Western bloc is but a cloak for British imperialism will be reassured. They will see in an economic union the most practical way of destroying economic barriers within a large area and thus of increasing production and raising the standard of living. In a federation of social-democratic countries they will see a means of strengthening international confidence, the key to the whole problem of collective security.

Instead of pretending that complete confidence exists between the "peace-loving" nations, many Europeans are inclined to believe that it is still lacking, mainly because of the ideological conflict that overlaps the present struggle for national independence. According to them it is more urgent and practical to build up confidence than to insist on a special brand of automatic peace mechanism. They see in the phrase "security system" a useful instrument, but one that must progressively become more efficient and powerful, through mutual understanding and fruitful compromises.

The first step is to create a state ot equilibrium between the great powers. A tri-polar system, and later a multi-polar one, is deemed preferable to the "ethical imperialism" of the Big Two—especially so since Western Europe would build an ideological bridge between Socialist Russia and capitalist America. Besides, the collective job of rehabilitation that must be undertaken would be greatly facilitated by regional planning. If the thorny economic and social questions are quickly solved within large areas, then agreements on a world scale are made possible: it will be easier for a few prosperous units to lay down rules of conduct and to stick to them than it would be for a large number of hungry rivals. Finally, regionalism can democratize and fortify the world organism for peace. The smaller states will soon realize that only their union in large federations can allow them to participate in the world government as active and responsible members. Some are already hoping that France and England will create a precedent in Western Europe.

Strange Doings in California

BY CAREY McWILLIAMS

Los Angeles, January 30

POLITICALLY California is one of the liveliest states in the union—a state in which "anything can happen"; it has been the scene of some fantastic political shenanigans during the past fifteen years. Even seasoned political observers, however, were stunned by Governor Warren's message to the legislature on January 8. Boldly seizing the initiative, the Governor has proposed a liberal, if by no means comprehensive, social program. Among its items are a compulsory health-insurance bill, large plans for preventive medical care, the establishment of a school of industrial relations at the University of California, the creation of a commission of inquiry into race relations, and a liberalization of unemployment-insurance legislation, including—miracle of miracles!—an extension of unemployment-insurance benefits to agricultural workers. Since as late as 1942 persons who advocated the inclusion of agricultural workers in the unemployment-insurance program were automatically denounced as "Communists," a practice in which the Governor actively participated, it is small wonder that his message has been referred to as a "bombshell" that "rocked the legislature." Coupled with the Governor's sudden, and total, reversal of attitude on the Japanese evacuee question, his message is important political news, and has been so interpreted in the West. To appreciate its effect one should realize that it came as a distinct surprise to most factions, including apparently his own stand-pat Republican backers, and is markedly at variance with his 1943 program and, indeed, with his entire political record to date.

Unquestionably the decisive factor in this sudden reversal was the November, 1944, election. There can be no doubt of the current liberal trend in California politics—the people gave President Roosevelt a plurality of 500,000—and Governor Warren apparently read the meaning of the election correctly. Prior to November he had given no hint of the kind of program he intended to sponsor, but between the election and January 8 he seems to have determined to make a bold bid for liberal support. His program shows evidence of hasty improvisation; the compulsory health-insurance legislation, for example, has not yet been drafted. It also indicates that the Governor, an ambitious man, is playing for national stakes. His message was quickly interpreted on the West Coast as a bid for reelection in 1946 as the necessary pre-condition to capturing the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1948.

Governor Warren's current appearance as a liberal repre-

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sents, under the circumstances, the minimum change consistent with political survival. For the Governor is in an exceptional predicament. He was elected in 1942 as a Republican running on a "non-partisan" platform. The "non-partisan" character of the campaign was stressed for the simple reason that a sizable majority of the registered voters of California were then, and still are, members of the Democratic Party. He was elected, in fact, by a defection of Democratic votes. He is in the position, therefore, of being a Governor who represents a minority party, despite the fact that the Republicans control both houses of the legislature. To maintain this precarious position, it is necessary for him to hold the Old Guard Republican support, which has always been his, and at the same time to snare a good many Democratic votes. Agility is the prime requisite of a politician occupying such a position.

His January 8 message knocked the Democrats off balance, but that is not in itself a major accomplishment. For the Democratic Party in California represents to an extravagant degree the incongruous elements that make up the party nationally. In California the Democrats are not so much a political party as a loose federation of disparate groups. The party leadership in the legislature is divided, inept, and furtively reactionary. Its initial response to the Governor's message was characteristic—bitter complaints that he had "stolen" the Democrats' program. When the Democratic leaders had recovered from the shock, they proceeded to do precisely what the Governor wanted them to do: they announced that henceforth they would be the "economy bloc" in the legislature.

But if the Democrats were shocked, "all has not been peaches and cream on the Republican side of the legislature," to quote Chester G. Hanson, veteran political correspondent for the Los Angeles *Times*. From the bewildered manner in which the Republicans behaved, it is apparent that they had no more warning of the new dispensation than their Democratic colleagues. It is extremely doubtful, in fact, whether even the Old Guard within the Republican Party received advance information; there is no evidence that they were consulted. The prevailing tone in the Republican press has been one of mild consternation mingled with cautionary admonitions. The Los Angeles *Times*, in commenting on the compulsory health-insurance program, declared there was much to be said on the matter "pro and con," pointed to "a wide diversity of opinion," and suggested "further study" of the proposal with postponement of actual consideration until after the war. If Governor Warren is on a hot spot, the Old Guard also occupies a rather embarrassing position. For Warren is their candidate—hand-picked, carefully trained, skilfully promoted. At this late hour there is no other candidate to whom they could turn if they should feel compelled to dump him. If they cannot support his program in its entirety, and they have given no indication that they intend to do so, still they can hardly afford to oppose it openly.

For the moment the Governor clearly holds the initiative. The only faction not caught off guard by his sudden putsch was the C. I. O., which constitutes the real spearhead of liberalism in California today. The C. I. O. has come forward with its own health-insurance plan without waiting for the introduction of the Governor's bill. While indorsing the Governor's "commission of inquiry into race relations," it has quickly proposed legislation for the creation of a state Fair Employment Practices Committee. As between the two health-insurance plans, the C. I. O.'s is much the better. To finance his plan, the Governor has proposed a 3 per cent tax on wages and salaries, one-half to be paid by the workers, one-half by the employers. The C. I. O. plan contemplates comprehensive coverage of all individuals now protected by unemployment insurance through a 3 per cent tax divided as proposed by the Governor but with the state bearing all administrative costs. In the Governor's plan, physicians would be compensated on a fee system; in the C. I. O. plan, on a per capita basis. Thus the issue is between the C. I. O. (and P. A. C.) elements on the one hand and the Governor on the other rather than between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.

To understand fully the Governor's position, it is necessary to consider one of the most peculiar political relationships in California—that between Governor Warren and Attorney General Robert W. Kenny. In a sense Bob Kenny is responsible for the Governor's successful career in state politics. When Earl Warren ran for Attorney General in 1938, he faced the likelihood of defeat, despite the fact that the Democratic nominee was not a strong candidate. The registration was overwhelmingly Democratic, more so than it is today, and the people were determined to oust the entire Republican machine. In this emergency Warren appealed to Kenny for support, setting forth in a letter in his own handwriting his undying devotion to civil liberties. Always inclined to be unpredictable where personalities are involved and often motivated by a remarkable generosity toward political opponents, Kenny proceeded to indorse Warren. It was really his action which tipped the scales, for even with the indorsement Warren was elected Attorney General by an extremely narrow margin.

Today Governor Warren is uneasily aware of the formidable Mr. Kenny, whose lengthening political shadow he sees whenever he looks guardedly over his shoulder. He fears that Robert W. Kenny can defeat him for the governorship in 1946. His position would be quite different were the Democrats without a strong candidate. But Bob Kenny is the ablest politician California has produced since the emergence of the Hiram Johnson of 1910—to be distinguished from the aged and embittered relic of isolationism who still survives in the Senate. In 1938 Warren was the only Republican elected to an important state office in California; in 1942 Kenney was the only Democrat elected. Just as Warren has been successful in wooing Democratic votes, so Kenny has shown a still more remarkable ability to draw strength from the Republican camp. Kenny's left flank is securely guarded, and he knows how to maneuver his right flank in an extremely dextrous fashion. Warren has a fairly secure right flank, considerable support in the center, and no support whatever on the left. The personal relationship between the two men is cordial, and they have cooperated effectively since Warren has been Governor, but the rivalry is intense if not overt. The older and more experienced politician, Governor Warren watches every move of his younger rival and has shown a surprising ability to imi-

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tate, and in some cases to anticipate, Kenny's genuine liberalism. The nation is likely to hear a great deal more about these two personalities in the future. For the Governor hopes to be President in 1948; and liberal Democrats throughout the West hope, some day, to send Bob Kenny to the White House. Without showing his hand, Bob Kenny is setting the political pace for the Governor.

The burning question in California at this moment is whether Governor Warren really intends to fight for his twelve-point program of social legislation. On the face of things he has a good chance of getting most of it adopted. Nominally, the Republicans control both houses of the legislature—twenty-seven to thirteen in the Senate, forty-two to thirty-eight in the Assembly. They are enabled to maintain this nominal control, despite the dominant Democratic registration, by two things—the havoc wrought in party politics in California by the system of cross-filing permitted in the state and the fact that the Senate is a most undemocratic body. The populous County of Los Angeles, for example, has but one representative in the Senate. For the most part, the Senate is made up of grim-faced, tight-fisted "cow-country" reactionaries, some Democrats, some Republicans.

Owing to the war the state's finances are in such excellent condition that the Governor can actually project a reduction in state taxes while sponsoring a liberal social program. The real powers in the state capitol, however, are the lobbyists. The most opulent of these, Art Samish, has more influence in the legislature than, say, the state chairman of the Republican Party. And Art Samish has no politics; he has clients. The situation is somewhat unique, therefore, in that a majority of the legislators are not directly responsive to pressure from their party or from the Governor or from the masses of the people. Despite this fact and despite the influence of the Samishes, the Governor could still control the situation if he were prepared to fight for his program, not merely by continuing to support it publicly but by "calling in the boys" and "turning on the heat."

Whether he intends to push the program to this extent will not be known until the legislature reconvenes after the coming recess. There are indications that the Governor's newly found, if limited liberalism is strictly *Ersatz* and that he has no intention of waging a last-ditch fight. On the other hand, if certain elements of the Old Guard have read the signs of the times as shrewdly as the Governor has, then it is conceivable that he might secure the adoption of the entire program, in which case it is equally conceivable that he might be reelected in 1946. If he is reelected in 1946, he will unquestionably be a leading contender for the Presidential nomination in 1948. He has opened his hand with some big cards, and the bets are in proportion to the stakes involved. It is worth noting, however, that his message did not present a comprehensive program. It largely ignored the question of federal-state relations, had little to say about the staggering post-war problems which California faces, and was generally silent about the war and the peace. In any case, a measure of national attention may well be fixed on Sacramento during the next few months, for the little drama being enacted there may be a pre-view of the 1948 campaign.

Nazi Post-War Strategy

BY ALFRED KANTOROWICZ

DR. GOEBBELS has been carefully fostering the idea, by direct and indirect means, that Nazism will wage a long, desperate underground battle inside the Reich after the defeat of its armies in the field. In fact, many observers in this country take it quite for granted that Himmler is making minute preparations for transforming the Gestapo, the S. S., and the Hitler Youth into guerrilla bands which will resist Allied occupation forces from their hideouts in the mountains, the forests, and the big cities.

The Nazis, unfortunately, have no such intention. They will emerge from defeat—with false names and forged documents—as willing servants of the occupation authorities. They will be agreeable, polite, decent fellows who want nothing but to help the Allies in the complicated task of preventing riots, anarchy, chaos. By appearing to serve the Allied administration faithfully, they will become its trusted colleagues.

A partial analogy to what we may expect in Germany is found here in the German prisoner-of-war camps. Generally the Nazi prisoners make it their business to behave "correctly" toward the camp authorities and guards. They are clean, alert, well-disciplined, and everyone praises their willingness to cooperate in practical matters. Many sources report that American military authorities have very little trouble with Nazi prisoners, and that they find it hard to believe that these pleasant boys are no different from the murderers of Maidanek. If disturbances occur in a camp, they are usually begun by anti-Nazis who insist upon arguing about political questions.

The Nazi prisoners of war know that there is little sense in making life miserable for the camp authorities. Their principal purpose is to keep their fellow-prisoners under control. Wherever opposition to Nazism appears in the ranks, it is mercilessly stamped out. Only after the New York *Times* told the story in January did people begin to realize the extent of the moral and physical terror to which the Nazis have been subjecting their fellow-prisoners—threats of reprisal after return to Germany, insinuations that exchanged prisoners would take back to Germany lists of all "insurgents" and that their families would be held as hostages, hangings, beatings, death.

The Nazis climbed to power by the ruthless suppression of "internal enemies," whom they called traitors, Jews, or Communists. Only after the Third Reich had succeeded in killing, imprisoning, or driving out all actual or potential defenders of democratic, socialist, and pacifist principles did it challenge

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its weaker neighbors—and later the great powers of the world.

The Nazi leaders are men of icy mind and brutal will, political strategists of the first order. They know that once their armed forces have been finally crushed—whether by the fall of Berlin or the fall of Berchtesgaden—one period of German imperialist activity will have definitely ended. They cannot initiate a second phase by a desperate, obviously futile struggle against their conquerors. But long-range plans can be laid, and the primary condition for their success, just as it was before, will be the "human material" at hand. The chief concern, then, of the surviving Nazi leaders, Junkers, industrialists, and imperialists will be to hold and gradually tighten their grip on the German masses.

For a while, perhaps, a few underground gangs will operate amid the ruins of Germany, armed desperadoes, war criminals who have nothing more to lose. They will be a nuisance but not actually dangerous, for the real force of Nazi Germany will not be behind them. The real "resistance" will be planned by other leaders and carried out by the strategy of "cooperation." The people will be permitted, even encouraged, to ease the physical burdens of the occupation authorities. But any attempt at ideological communion will be obstructed and punished by death, through the "vehme," or secret courts.

These so-called "vehme" courts were a product of the political struggles in Germany after the First World War and were used by the Freikorps, the Black Reichswehr, and early S. A. gangs. *"Verräter verfallen der Vehme"*—"traitors will be punished by the vehme courts"—was a slogan by which all peace-loving and democratic-minded Germans were terrorized. For everyone was a "traitor" who desired a genuine understanding with Germany's former enemies or the consolidation of Germany's progressive elements. The world duly noted the assassination of the Catholic leader Mathias Erzberger and the democratic Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, but it failed to recognize the significance of the many minor vehmic murders which inevitably broke the democratic backbone of the country. We shall see a re-emergence of these self-styled vehme courts in Germany on a far greater scale. It is for their administration that Himmler has trained tens of thousands of his most reliable, fanatical Nazis.

The Nazis hope that after five years have passed they will have achieved their first aim—the physical destruction and moral intimidation of anti-imperialist, anti-Nazi forces in Germany—and have regained their temporarily loosened hold on the German masses. They hope that by that time American and British troops will have gone home, assured of the cooperative attitude of the Germans. France, Belgium, and Holland, exhausted by the war and busy with their own reconstruction, will relax their vigilance. Then the German nationalists can again begin to prepare, step by step, the moral and material rearmament of the German people.

How far this Nazi strategy will succeed depends on two closely related factors—the degree of unity among the main Allies and the use the Allies make of anti-fascist forces within Germany. A policy of appeasement, a deal with the reactionary elements in the country, will amount to sponsorship of the Nazis' post-war dreams.

In the Wind

A READER PASSES ON to us an article from the German propaganda magazine *Signal* for January 1, 1944, which has just reached him. The magazine was found on the body of a dead German soldier. The article is a translation of America, the Land of Promises, by Henry J. Taylor, in the September, 1943, issue of the *Reader's Digest*. Taylor's article consisted of excerpts from his book "Men in Motion." The *Reader's Digest* prefaced it with this editorial note: "America's policy of exaggerated internationalism is as dangerous, foolhardy, and destructive as narrow isolationism." *Signal* prefaced it thus: "In September, 1943, the *Reader's Digest* published excerpts from the book 'Men in Motion.' The author, Henry J. Taylor, was a correspondent in Africa, Palestine, and Syria for North American newspapers; his thoughts are of interest to us Europeans also. They show that *Signal's* analysis of American affairs has paralleled that of clear-thinking Americans themselves."

AN ASTROLOGIST ADVERTISES in the Carnegie Hall program booklet that she "is now specializing her practice in post-war rehabilitation cases and vocational guidance."

THE CHICAGO *SUN* REPORTS that "Dewey, an American of the Century," the official campaign biography published last year at $2.50, is now on sale in Chicago at 10 cents a copy. The price in New York is 49 cents.

APPLICATION BLANKS for membership in the Gideons International, the organization that puts Bibles in hotel rooms, contain this note: "IMPORTANT: The object of the Gideons is to associate Christian business men (white) for service, and to carry to the world the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ." In answer to an inquiry N. F. Dewar, secretary, wrote, "We do not accept into our association any but those of the white race."

FESTUNG EUROPA: A new weapon in the Norwegians' war of nerves against the Nazis is the "telephone bomb." A stranger phones to a factory, business office, or public building and warns that the place is about to be blown up. There have been so many explosions that such warnings cannot be taken lightly. The disruptive effect is considerable. . . . The extreme youth of the new Nazi recruits in Denmark has given rise to this joke: "They say Hitler has asked for a forty-eight-hour armistice." "Why?" "Oh, they say he has two divisions that are going to be confirmed on Sunday." . . . Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar, Nazi military commentator, explained the situation thus in a recent lecture in Bratislava: "We have taken our European task so seriously as to hold on to areas more than once solely out of regard for this or that ally or neutral state in order not to endanger them. Our European conscience was so strong that for the sake of our allies we undertook enterprises which were often beyond our strength."

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. We will pay $1 for each item accepted.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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When Does Morale Break?

BY JOSEPH BORNSTEIN

THE hope that the European war would end in 1944 was based mainly on optimistic speculation about the state of German morale. Though no serious analyst, even when the Allied armies were advancing rapidly through France, expected that they could fight their way through to Berlin and Munich in a few weeks, many persons hoped that a collapse of German morale would open the road and spare the Allies the effort and the risks of further battles. Optimism was nurtured by various factors that were supposed to decrease Germany's will-to-resist—the great air raids against German cities and the threat of even more destructive bombings to come, Germany's terrific losses on the eastern front, the expulsion of the Wehrmacht from France, and the capitulation of Germany's last allies in Europe. The combined force of these developments, many believed, would reduce German morale to the breaking-point before the Allied armies reached the Rhine. It was thought that the Germans could not but realize that further fighting, especially on German soil, would merely mean senseless sacrifices on their part. Yet German morale did not break.

In 1944, and before, German morale was indeed very low, at least in the interior of the country. The events of June 20, whether these represented a genuine revolt or preventive action by Himmler, made it clear that even generals and staff officers, as well as civil servants in high positions and leaders of industry, no longer believed in the possibility of German victory. Nazi newspapers had for a long time reported almost daily that workers and middle-class men and women were being punished by Nazi courts for defeatist talk, spreading rumors, offending Nazi officials, helping foreign workers and prisoners of war, listening to foreign radio stations, refusing to work, and the like. There is much evidence that disillusionment, skepticism about propaganda, hatred for the regime, and longing for peace had spread through Germany as never before in a country at war. Even in 1918 Germany had not shown such defeatism. Nevertheless, there was no explosion.

When does morale break? In 1940 and 1941 the Germans expected to break British morale by the blitz. Today it is generally conceded that the blitz actually had the opposite effect. When the R. A. F. began to bomb German cities in earnest, many observers doubted Germany's ability to endure such attacks for long. As it turned out, German morale was able to withstand several years of strategic bombing.

It is certain that at some critical moments in the life of nations, when everything is at stake, a minor incident may become decisive. When the morale of a people has been brought close to the breaking-point, just a bit more of suffering and horror may cause the explosion. Who knows what would have happened to England in 1940 if the Germans at that time had been able to add the V-bombs of 1944 to the blitz of the Luftwaffe? Apparently human nature, given a little time, is able to adapt itself to seemingly unbearable conditions. People can get used to almost anything once the first shock is absorbed. In 1940, when France collapsed, weakness and treason gave the people no chance to become accustomed to the effects of Stukas and Panzers. The British had time to adjust themselves to the blitz; the Germans had time to get used to strategic bombing—and to many other things.

Private letters written to German soldiers as far back as 1942 by family, friends, and sweethearts are in the hands of the Allies. These letters deal mostly with the first great air raids over German cities and the hardships of the eastern front; they mirror the average German's first realization that the end of the war was still far off, that the outcome was uncertain. Reading these letters, one has difficulty in imagining greater sadness and disillusionment, a bleaker hopelessness. Through hundreds of pages runs the leitmotiv: there must be a change for the better very soon, because things are so bad that no change, or a change for the worse, is unimaginable. At the time these letters fell into Allied hands things had become much worse from the German point of view, but there was hardly any evidence that morale had deteriorated still further and none at all that it was "breaking." Goebbels's shrewd propaganda may have helped the people over the crisis, but propaganda could not change the reality they had to endure. One can only conclude that they grew accustomed to the reality.

Apparently morale does not break automatically when subject to a certain amount of strain. Sometimes, however, as history shows, poor morale acts as an infection and as such has decisive effects. At those times it spreads like a disease in all directions, from factories and market-places to government offices and police stations, from civilians to the armed forces, from the man in the street to the rulers in chancelleries and staff headquarters. Finally it paralyzes the instruments of power in the hands of these rulers, and they give up—as they did in Russia in 1917, in Austria and Germany in 1918, in Italy in 1943, in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary in 1944. The Nazi rulers, it is true, are not likely to be affected by their subjects' low morale. Their instruments of power—the Elite Guard, the Gestapo, Nazi officials of all ranks—are bound to them by the fear of having to share their leaders' fate in case of defeat. The leaders themselves have no doubt that their own lives will be lost if they cede power. They know very well that for them there is no way out.

Germany's morale held in 1944 because some essential condition of collapse was lacking. Some kind of spark is needed to cause the explosive transition from low morale to breaking morale. There must be incitement to action and

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also the possibility of effective action. The front-line soldier whose morale sinks to a certain level can surrender to the enemy; he can escape from his difficulties by merely raising his arms. As a prisoner of war he will receive food, he will be allowed to sleep. The civilian in the interior cannot surrender: only by suicide can he put an instant end to his sufferings. The average German who has lost his belief in the Nazis, or who never had such belief, who is fed up with the war and longs for peace, has very little chance to act. Any attempt to change his situation would require him to become a hero—for one has to be a hero to disregard the power of the Gestapo, disobey and resist the Nazi rulers, and risk execution as a traitor. But exhaustion and hopelessness do not breed heroes en masse. Moreover, most Germans think correctly that they will all have to pay anyway for what the Nazis have done to other nations. No hopes such as were aroused in Germany in 1918 by the example of the Russian Revolution and the discussion of Woodrow Wilson's ideas neutralize German fears of things to come. We should not be surprised that German morale has not yet broken. Forceful underground movements have not developed in any country without some help from the outside. Not many men will risk their lives simply to hasten the defeat of their own armies and to deliver themselves up to the uncertain will of many victors. At any rate it seems that many Germans, low as their spirits have sunk, have chosen to wait. They may grumble, they may sometimes pray that the Lord and the United Nations hasten the end, but their depression of yesterday, today, and tomorrow does not influence events.

One day, nevertheless, German morale may break. It will certainly break if greater losses than Germany has already suffered destroy the physical power of the Nazi machine, if Gestapo and Black Guards become too tired and hopeless to do their duty and refuse to break up strikes and riots and to prevent the liberation of prisoners—even Gauleiters and Himmler's aides may become unable to carry on. Until then, however, we shall be in a safer and clearer position if we count exclusively upon victories in the field. German soldiers have an opportunity to surrender. German civilians do not.

Latin American Front

GUATEMALA is the first Western Hemisphere country to sever relations with Franco Spain, and Cuba is reported about to become the second. Mexico has never recognized Franco. After its break with Spain, Guatemala announced that it would expel all Falange agents, including a number of Spanish "priests," under the same law that provided for the expulsion of Nazi agents after Pearl Harbor. . . . RECOGNITION of the Farrell-Perón regime in Argentina as a result of the Foreign Ministers' meeting at Mexico City on February 22 looms as a dread possibility to the democratic Argentine people, according to Gonzalez Iramain, former Socialist deputy and representative of Patria Libre, the Argentine pro-democratic organization. Gonzalez claims that if the other American countries refuse to recognize the present regime and apply economic sanctions, the Argentines themselves can reestablish a democratic government. The State Department is said to be sending out unofficial preliminary feelers to find out what concessions Argentina might make to secure recognition. If the regime's intransigent mood holds through the coming Foreign Ministers' meeting and if, in consequence, a strong non-appeasement policy is adopted by the meeting, pro-democratic forces may score a real victory. . . . A CONTINENT-WIDE STRIKE called by the C. T. A. L. (Latin American Federation of Labor) for January 25 as a demonstration against Argentine dictatorship materialized in only eight countries. Between the no-strike pledge and the harsh anti-labor character of the governments in many of the countries for which the strike had been scheduled, its effectiveness as a show of labor strength was almost nullified. In Argentina proper the regime displayed its iron fist in a flimsy glove. Throughout the day all radio stations broadcast a new decree requiring employers to grant workers regular vacations, and at the same time the government took stern steps to prevent any possibility of a strike; despite these measures several minor demonstrations occurred. . . . AVRA M. WARREN, in his new post as director of the Office of American Republics, will probably add a few more nails to the coffin of the Good Neighbor policy. Known for his effective work in keeping Spanish Loyalist and French Popular Front refugees out of this country and in helping to secure recognition of the terroristic Bolivian regime, he can be counted on to insure our losing valuable friends and making important enemies—the people of Latin American countries, as opposed to their governments, are genuinely pro-democratic. . . . PERU'S UNDERGROUND Aprista Party staged its first national convention since 1931 in a secret meeting hall near Lima last month; 308 enemies of the dictatorship decided to "fight to establish a true democracy" by participating in the 1945 elections, changed their organization's name to the Peruvian People's Party, and adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the Catholic church, which is coming into its own in Latin America as elsewhere. . . . PUERTO RICO'S new Partido Popular, which won the elections last fall, has drafted a program by which the island can maintain economic balance while taking its first steps in political independence. The party proposes that the following measures be put into effect after independence: conversion of the sugar industry into public utilities, with profits limited to $25,000 for each concern; continuation of the land-distribution policy—this has already resulted in the division of a number of former estates among 52,000 families; nationalization of power companies; creation of a development bank to encourage new industries and extend the activities of those already established; exemption from taxes of all real estate valued at less than $1,000; establishment of minimum wages in all industries. Similar proposals might well be formulated by other territories, colonies, and protectorates hoping for independence. . . . IN TOTALITARIAN BRAZIL domestic mail is now censored, and it is difficult for persons in one section of the country to know what is going on in another. Vargas alone is cleverer than both members of the Farrell-Perón team. According to some reports, the presence of United States troops and bases in Brazil has created the impression that we will suppress any uprising against him, a fact that may endear the United States to Vargas, but hardly to his subject people. V. M.

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Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

THE war has taken on a tempo that is hard to keep up with. A column written early enough to fit a weekly magazine's schedule may become old stuff before it appears in print. With that in mind, let us look at some of the incidents in the last act of the drama.

After the fall of a regime the succeeding government has always considered it extremely important to obtain the documents of the deposed government intact. The facts that emerge from the secret protocols, correspondence, and orders are usually invaluable from the material, the moral, and the historical point of view. The Nazis learned this in 1918, when the German Republic, and also the Allies, derived immense advantage from the records of the imperial German government. It could be assumed, therefore, that the Hitler gang would do everything imaginable to prevent their papers from falling into strange hands.

Panic about their documents developed first in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice—with good reason. Months ago the two ministries moved from Berlin to Breslau, which was supposed to be safe. As the Russians advanced toward Breslau and chaos broke loose in the city, the safety of these ministries' records was the first thing thought of. Their removal was accomplished by plane with proper haste. And it can be taken for granted that in all the eastern provinces immediately threatened, important local records—those of the Gauleiter, the Gestapo, and the like—have also been transported to a place of safety.

In Berlin steps were taken to save the official documents as soon as the military crisis became acute. The Swedish press carried reports of the caravans of trucks that were driven into the courtyards of the ministries still in Berlin, particularly the Reich Chancellery, and driven out piled high with more or less carefully packed maps and papers. Where was this precious stuff being taken? If the Berlin correspondent of the Stockholm *Tidningen* is to be believed, it was all being carried off to the Bavarian Alps—or, to be more precise, to the vicinity of Hitler's eyrie, Berchtesgaden. It is rather odd that this correspondent's dispatch, as printed in the Stockholm newspaper on January 23, got through the Berlin telegraph office, since it contained statements which ordinarily no military censor would let pass. The possibility that the whole thing was a plant should not be excluded. On the other hand, in times of great confusion things happen which would be unthinkable in normal circumstances. The dispatch gave the following details:

> The German government has decided to evacuate the important documents of all ministries to Berchtesgaden, where extensive fortifications are now practically finished. Experts say that the so-called Berchtesgaden fortress is impregnable. Ammunition, food, and medicine for several years have been stored in it. The greater part of all the Nazi Party's important documents are already there. The government officials will probably go to places near Munich.

I would advise the reader not to worry about the possibility that after the battle for Fortress Europe and then for Fortress Germany six more years will be needed to subdue Fortress Berchtesgaden. One can no longer take much stock in the word "impregnable." It seems plausible, however, that the important papers of the Nazi regime will be concentrated in one spot where on the last day of the thousand-year Reich they can all be reduced to ashes in a colossal auto-da-fé. This bonfire, even if it is kindled in the majestic setting of the Alps, will not correspond perfectly to the *Götterdämmerung* fantasies of the Nazi neo-Wagnerians, but it may be the only part of them that comes true. And although more has been destroyed in the world than these papers, their burning—which there is no earthly way of preventing—will be a severe loss to the contemporary world and to posterity.

In the meantime we see no weakening of the leading Nazis' monstrous determination to exert all their remaining might to the end that the Reich, "like a torpedoed battleship, will sink beneath the waves with its batteries firing." And there is no sign that in their shrinking territory the Nazis will not successfully quell every large-scale defection and desertion, every revolution from above or below, every mutiny, separatist movement, or "capitulation à la 1918." The material situation grows worse, one may say hourly. On January 23 all the express trains in Germany and a considerable number of the local trains were halted for lack of coal. On the same day the *Völkische Beobachter* announced that the gas would be cut off in every home which had any other kind of stove—were it one handed down from great-grandmother's time—that could be used for cooking. To relieve the railroads, even the sending of letters by post was stopped. The disorganization of transportation is also reflected in a decree applying to the "thousand instances" of freight addressed to persons "who cannot be found"; cars loaded with goods without an owner block the rails and stations. But all this only spurs the people in power to invent new tricks to arouse the masses' fighting spirit. Himmler has ordered that recruits for the army shall be sworn in with a solemn new ceremony, which is described in the *Völkische Beobachter* of January 21:

> Formerly the ceremony was conducted in a barracks yard as a purely military form. Henceforth it will symbolize the solidarity between the battle front and the home front, and will take place in public in the presence of the local armament workers. The machines will be stopped while the recruits swear the sacred oath to die for the Führer and the German Reich. The armament workers will then present some newly manufactured weapons to the company leader, and a band will play, "God, who made iron, wanted no slaves" (*"Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess, der wollte keine Knechte"*).

The campaign to make the population afraid to collaborate in any way with the enemy continues. For some time Germans have been told that a patriotic *Fehme* (secret court) in the occupied regions kills every traitor to the Fatherland. Many tales—all invented—of such secret murders in areas under Anglo-American control have been served up. On January 20 the radio and the newspapers circulated accounts of four new cases, giving names and places—one man executed by hanging, three by shooting.

> The men killed by the *Fehme* were notorious characters who ingratiated themselves with the Americans by slandering and denouncing nationalist-minded German workmen. Together with a Jewish interpreter they held drinking bouts and blackmailed our countrymen. They have been warned, and now they have met the fate they deserved.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Some Young Poets and a New Genre

OWING to the prosperity of the big publishers and the zeal of small subsidized concerns like New Directions and the Cummington Press, many young poets are now appearing in book form. To judge by the half-dozen I have lately read, the young Americans are not particularly original. In recent verse there is only one very arresting technical development—the descriptive satire, to which I shall return later on. For the rest, Hopkins, Yeats, Eliot, and Auden are still the great influences; and the impact of the seventeenth-century metaphysicals is more direct than ever. In addition to being involved in artifice and loaded with conceits like a baroque reredos, this verse often speaks the very idiom of the seventeenth-century masters, carrying archaism much farther than did even the generation of Eliot. In the work of the young Trappist monk Thomas Merton—an intense mind but a rather undistinguished stylist—the kinship is with Henry Vaughn, great seventeenth-century mystic and lover of children and nature. But John Donne is the metaphysical most commonly appropriated by the younger Americans. Sometimes, however, their poems, elaborated out of proportion to the emotional charge, suggest not Donne but Erasmus Darwin, as if our seventeenth century were slily turning into an eighteenth century.

> Often like hail
> The branded hands of mad Corona flail:
> Covies of frightened meaning soar.

These young poets direct much energy to detail and seldom attempt operations on any scale; instead, it is lyrics, lyrics, lyrics. Perhaps it is the distressing state of the world which sentences them to this fragmentary utterance. In any case, among the volumes I am considering no single poem is as long as Eliot's early Prufrock, and none pretends to anything like its dramatic and speculative range. Most of the young continue, however, to subscribe to the expressionist doctrine which informs all modernist poetry and according to which poetic beauty consists in a style imitative of the complexities and surprises of the mind rather than in a style inspired by given standards of harmony and felicity. On the whole this doctrine is still fruitful in the practice of the younger poets; but there are exceptions. Occasionally someone will work hard for the expressive and produce only the gauche. In the pretentious infelicities of Eve Merriam, for example, modernist poetry achieves a rowdy burlesque of itself. Miss Merriam specializes in the poetry of the *physical:*

> down to the muddy ground oh look at it tumbling:
> the idiot accident blobber-mouthed and fumbling!
>
> Eyesocket leaps like egg,
> flops yellow-oozing down.
>
> Neither male nor female any more;
> a girl you nestle in my house of hair,
> I climb your legs and bandy boyish war.

Considerable devotion to form is the rule among the younger poets, although again there are exceptions. The temperament of Tennessee Williams, for example, is fresh, adventurous, and Western; but lacking structure, lacking even the will to concentrate and organize his materials, he simply reads like a good foreign poet in an indifferent translation. In Jean Garrigue, on the other hand, an exceptional delicacy combines with a nice sense of architecture. Instead of merely stringing images together, as so many American poets have done since Whitman, Miss Garrigue understands the nearly lost art of writing sentences in verse. It is true that her attachment to Hopkins sometimes leads to irritating preciosities of syntax:

> But nor sun purifies nor strengthens by air
> That warped delicacy!

Yet her straight writing is beautifully articulated:

> Now upon this piteous year
> I sit in Denmark beside the quai
> And nothing that the fishers say
> Or the children carrying boats
> Can recall me from that place
> Where sense and wish departed me
> Whose very shores take on
> The whiteness of anon.

Indeed, what Miss Garrigue chiefly needs is a subject compelling enough to let color and light into the refined dimness of her poetic world. Her love poems are at present her best. When she is not writing of love she is, so far as I make out, not writing of much of anything; and she is then apt to occupy herself with tricks and fancies which impress me as trifling.

I come finally to the new development of which I spoke above, the descriptive satire. Of this form Karl Shapiro is the chief exponent, but Randall Jarrell, Robert Lowell, and John Frederick Nims work in it. The basic method is familiar: it consists in juxtaposing to the vulgar or terrible things of modern life the beauties or pieties of an older culture, often of an earlier stage of American culture. But this poetry of disappointed hopes and broken promises is now exploited with more fervor than it was even by Pound and Eliot. The subject, usually some very definite contemporary incident or phenomenon, is visualized with care at the same time that it is ransacked for its metaphorical possibilities and sardonic implications; and the verse, freighted with resounding language, tends toward a pomposity appropriate to the poem's mock-heroic intention.

> And now the legion bones of Arlington
> Laid out in marble alphabets
> Stare on the great tombs of the capitol . . .

One of the earliest examples of the descriptive satire was Karl Shapiro's Washington Cathedral, in which a visitor to that structure, after gazing at the neo-Gothic wonders of the interior, steps outside to discover that "a red naked crane/ Hangs over the unfinished transept,/a Cubist hen rivaling the Gothic School." The cathedral is thus seen to be only a

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

by Morris R. Cohen
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—*Morton G. White*

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"deus ex machina," its phony grandeurs typifying the "tons of fake magnificence" under which all modern Washington buries its great heroes and its great past. By comparison with the achievements of Yeats and Eliot, the descriptive satire is a small thing—it is modern poetry shrunken to mere genre—but in it the toughness and realism of the twenties, fortified in many cases by the political insight of later times, survive as they do in hardly any other form of contemporary writing.

The varied targets of Shapiro's satire were indicated in the title of his first book, "Person, Place, and Thing." It is by things that John Frederick Nims is chiefly attracted: the repulsive paraphernalia of an industrial city. These he likes to ridicule by presenting them as beautiful or holy or romantic; so that in each of his poems there takes place a kind of malign transformation scene which only leaves the things in question more gruesome than before. The illuminated signs of movie houses become "New stars rising, *Gem* and *Regent*"; their interiors are "spearmint heavens"; a penny arcade is a "pale and dusty palace under the El"; a magazine stand is a "grotto of our lacquered saints"; an El train is a ship in which

> On nights of rain, the captain in the prow
> Dares in great dark the iron-charted flood,
> Follows a star of harbor green as mint,
> Skirting disaster's little eye of blood.
> Is fortunate yet, for sudden in the night
> Stations arrive like Indias of light.

This is charming, and much of Nims's work is equally ingenious, even though it seems finally to belong to the realm rather of fancy than of imagination. For just as, by comparison with Shapiro, Nims is too inflexible a metrist, so he is inferior in power of generalization; and his great peril is whimsy.

The most brilliant poet to emerge since Jarrell and Shapiro is Robert Lowell, who brings to satire the ethical ferocity and outraged idealism of a latter-day Bostonian turned Catholic. His poem Christmas Eve in the Time of War, which carries the subtitle, A Capitalist Meditates by a Civil War Monument, is a clear example of the kind of satire I have been discussing. For, as its title indicates, the symbol on which it builds its complicated structure of allusions—religious, political, historical—is a definite object in a definite time: a Civil War monument observed on a snowy Christmas Eve during the Second World War.

> Stone generals
> Perching upon a pillar of dead snow,
> Two cannon and a cairn of cannon balls,
> Livid in the unfinished marble, know
> How Christmas drunkards left them in the cold,
> While Christ the King is rocking on the mould.

But Lowell's work is not confined to this sort of satire. As Allen Tate observes in his introduction to Lowell's book, the poetry is of two types, one avowedly Catholic and a little theoretical, the other "richer in immediate experience . . . the references being personal and historical and the symbolism less willed and explicit." This seems in general to be true. Allusions to his ancestral Boston lend to one group of Lowell's poems striking concreteness; Boston is the "unreal city" of his private waste land. And if it is his luck to be sprung from a milieu so thick with ghosts and relics, it is

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his virtue to have exploited the chance so passionately in his work. He is a poet of very high promise and distinction.

NOTE: Thomas Merton's work appears in "Thirty Poems," New Directions, $1; Eve Merriam, Tennessee Williams, John Frederick Nims, and Jean Garrigue are published, together with a run-of-the-mill Latin American, Alejandro Carrion, in "Five Young American Poets, Third Series, 1944," New Directions, $3; Robert Lowell's book is "Land of Unlikeness," the Cummington Press, $3. F. W. DUPEE

BRIEFER COMMENT

Open Secrets

THE INFORMATION contained in the 1,200 pages, of small type, of "The Secret History of the War," by Waverley Root (Scribner's, $10), was not hitherto secret, and the two volumes bring one down only to the close of 1942. Besides a vast quantity of essential facts the author has felt compelled to provide an excess of cartilage and connective tissue. It is not secret history that the British soldier is ill at ease without his beer, and there is far too much conjecture and interpretation, together with prodigious amounts of gossip, much of it doubtless true. It is hardly important to know that shortly before his attack on Russia Hitler delivered a private three-hour speech to a blonde young opera singer of soft curves and different expectations. Sometimes the author includes his own suppressed dispatches at full length. Elsewhere he gives far too much description of public states of mind. The Pacific war is not treated at all.

But these things admitted, it must be said that the book is a useful one. It does contain a vast amount of absolutely essential information, much of which has been given little or no space in the daily press. Its valuable substance is, as it were, all that background material which the diligent, well-connected political journalist has brought to editorial conference rooms for his paper's guidance. Much of it might be called "off-the-record stuff." Here and there is a minor scoop. In other places one is surprised at a shrewd estimate or a keen analysis.

To sum up: Mr. Root has written a new kind of history of the first three and a half years of the European war. At one-third the size it could have been a remarkable book. It is now a useful but garrulous compendium of "inside facts" and knowing talk. RALPH BATES

William of Orange

WHEN WILLIAM, PRINCE OF ORANGE, assumed leadership of the Dutch revolt against the King of Spain, his legitimate overlord, he had no intention of founding a new state. He resisted the encroachments of Madrid upon the government at Brussels and claimed for the Netherlands Knights of the Golden Fleece, the highest nobility of the Low Countries, paramount influence over native affairs. The burghers, on the other hand, had reasons of their own for resenting Spanish rule. King Philip II, consistently pursuing the course steered by his ancestors, the Dukes of Burgundy, strove to unite the bewildering diversity of duchies,

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counties, and seigneuries that constituted the Netherlands into a closely knit, centralized state. But the Dutch people clung to their local and provincial rights and privileges. Their resistance was prompted by the wish to preserve medieval variety from being merged in uniformity. Native conservatism refused to accept the centralized administration imposed upon it by a foreign ruler. Popular resentment, however, would not have gathered the strength for successful resistance if it had not been fired by religious zeal. It was the inhuman persecution of heretics that turned political discontent into armed rebellion. Democratic Calvinism was the militant force that liberated the Netherlands. The Knights of the Golden Fleece, realizing that they had unchained forces that threatened their own power no less than that of the sovereign, abandoned the cause of the rebels and submitted again to the King of Spain. Prince William alone decided otherwise. And in that decision he showed his greatness. He stood by the Calvinist burghers, not because he liked Geneva better than Rome, but because he knew that freedom for the Dutch people could be won only with the aid of the zealots of the Reformed religion. Their zeal would not grant to the Catholics the freedom of worship they claimed for themselves. Prince William championed tolerance toward all believers. But he had to abandon that counsel of perfection for the immediate need of Calvinist support. The proud Knight of the Golden Fleece, forsaken by his equals, was henceforth the rebel leader of despised heretics.

The story of Prince William's tragic life set forth in C. V. Wedgwood's volume "William the Silent" (Yale, $3) is a moving tale of frustrated hopes and indomitable perseverance in spite of repeated failure. He knew himself as an instrument in the hands of divine providence. Under its guidance he accomplished miraculously the very reverse of what he set out to accomplish: the revolt that was started to preserve the medieval heritage of the Dutch resulted in the foundation of a modern state, which fifty years after his death aroused the admiration and envy of all Europe. His latest biographer combines sound learning with literary ability. She has written a beautiful book that will give comfort to those readers who despair of this age, which in so many respects resembles that of the Prince of Orange.

A. J. BARNOUW

Organized Labor in China

FOR YEARS many people have lamented the lack of an authoritative book on Chinese labor. Because of the appalling scarcity of reliable information on the subject in English, researchers have been forced to avoid the topic. In "The Chinese Labor Movement" (John Day, $2.75) Nym Wales successfully overcomes this handicap by drawing on hitherto unpublished material which she obtained in interviews with veteran Chinese labor leaders on her visit to Yenan. As a result we have for the first time the full story of the rise of a militant Chinese labor movement between 1922 and 1927 to a peak of three million members, which was followed by the Shanghai massacre of April 12, 1927, and the subsequent suppression and elimination of all free trade unionism in China. Members of American labor unions will find the discussion of the Chinese Association of Labor particularly instructive in view of the $1,250,000 which they intrusted to this organization in 1943 and 1944 in the belief that they were helping Chinese labor. Miss Wales quotes official Chinese documents to show that the Chinese Association of Labor is a cultural and welfare rather than a trade-union organization and that the "unions" which make up its membership were largely organized by the Kuomintang under strict government control. Most of these "unions" operate in public enterprises, and under the law they have the right neither to strike nor to bargain collectively. In contrast, Miss Wales finds the beginnings of a genuine democratic workers' movement in the 1,350 Chinese industrial cooperatives and in the "free" labor unions of the guerrilla areas. While the story of all of these developments is necessarily fragmentary, students of China and anyone who is interested in the struggle of labor will find this little book extremely useful.

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The Other Germany Again

IF MANY DELIGHT to shock us with reports of proto-Nazis at all points in the history of German culture, there are also more generous souls to remind us of "the other Germany." Two of the latest reminders are Heine's "Germany, a Winter's Tale," in a new English version by Herman Salinger (L. B. Fischer, $2.75), and "Against the Current: the Life of Karl Heinzen," by Carl Wittke (Chicago, $3.75).

Heine writes of a trip to Hamburg which was one of the few interruptions of his long exile in Paris; he denounces Prussianism, and so the poem, written in 1844, is topical a hundred years later. Despite Hermann Kesten's passionate introduction one is not convinced that such topicality goes very deep, and Mr. Salinger himself was so embarrassed by Heine's preface that he put it at the back of the book; but these things need not detain us here. More pertinent is the fact that Heine found it possible stridently to denounce Prussianism, yet to praise the other Germany. For the new version Mr. Salinger has composed honest, crisp, colloquial verses. Those who cannot read German will get the impression that Heine was almost a poet. What translation of Heine gives a better impression?

Professor Wittke's project was a simpler and less ambiguous undertaking. His life of the great German American Karl Heinzen (1809-80) is appropriately solid and business-like. To read it made me realize how excessively my knowledge of German socialism a hundred years ago was limited to what Marx and the Marxists have told me. In freeing an independent radical from the disgrace and obscurity conferred upon him by the disingenuous slurs of doctrinaires Professor Wittke has performed one of the finest services of scholarship. And he has written an interesting book.

ERIC RUSSELL BENTLEY

FICTION IN REVIEW

THE winter fiction season has been unusually lean. There have been far fewer new novels in this pre- and post-holiday period than there were in the same period last year, and one begins to wonder whether the publishers have run out of even bad books, as is reported to have happened in England after a few years of war. Well, pending either such a total drought or, what is more likely, the renewed spring torrents, here are a few notes on some random volumes about which you may have had a mild curiosity.

"The End of All Men" by the Swiss writer C. F. Ramuz (Pantheon, $2.50), although now published in English for the first time, is not a new work; the publishers do not tell us the date of its original European appearance, but I gather from Denis de Rougemont's introduction that it was about twenty years ago. A fantasy in which the concerns of our daily lives are measured in the light of a cosmic catastrophe, "The End of All Men" not only belongs to a category of fiction to which I am a priori hostile, it being my experience that such large subjects as the imminent destruction of the human race have a way of inviting easy psychologizing and philosophic banalities, but in addition is written in a style that I find a peculiarly pretentious bore. Mr. de Rougemont

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mentions the affinity of this style with the technique of the moving picture: "You will soon notice, when you read 'The End of All Men,' that in this book everything is seen before it is explained. Certain parts of this *epopée* are written like a motion-picture scenario. The characters appear in the light, a head, an arm—the close-up of a hand. . . ." But this seems to me to describe the technique of an arty and self-conscious, and dated, cinema which there never was any reason for literature to try to imitate. And actually Ramuz's novel doesn't put me in mind of the work of the camera at all. Rather, it strongly recalls to me the work of Masereel, of those dull, plodding, morally suffocating stories in woodcut which also once enjoyed an esoteric vogue.

To call "Crying at the Lock" by Adeline Rumsey (Simon and Schuster, $2.50) a psychological thriller is to ignore its ambitions to serious psychological insights; to call it a serious psychological novel is to be grossly taken in by its psychiatric pretensions. Actually Miss Rumsey's history of a young man beset both by memories of a dead first wife and the malignities of his second choice is melodrama for the better lending-library trade, at the level where simple story-telling must show its passport of literacy and sophistication; and there would seem, these days, to be no better proof of worldliness than psychiatric paraphernalia. In addition, Miss Rumsey's book sustains a general air of lively, decent intelligence which makes it hard to remember that one is reading merely a time-killer.

In "The Golden Rooms" (Vanguard, $2.50) Vardis Fisher continues the good, not too clean fun with his anthropoid forbears which he started in "Darkness and the Deep." The title of the present volume refers to the discovery of fire, a development which Mr. Fisher re-creates with searing vividness. Fortunately I have no knowledge of anthropology to be challenged or provoked by this fictionalized account of mankind's rise to its present stature. I simply enjoy myself and let any old steps-in-progress fall as they will. But I do have the impression that this march toward civilization is becoming harder and harder on the stomach—an evolution which I suspect it is a little within the pleasure of the narrator to modify. For example, Mr. Fisher's new volume celebrates a feast of mammoth, the recollection of which I still keep down with only the greatest difficulty.

Of the two mystery novels in Elliot Paul's "I'll Hate Myself in the Morning *and* Summer in December" (Random House, $2.50) I read only the second, an excursion into Nazi sabotage in Chile. Since Mr. Paul failed to raise a goose pimple on this susceptible skin, I very much doubt the appeal of his book to the thriller addict. But on the other hand, perhaps by some happy chance the addicted public has become so surfeited with horror and violence that it is ready to welcome an anti-fascist story notable for its very lack of bloodthirstiness.

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Drama

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

EVEN the least ardent admirers of Miss Margaret Webster are not likely to question her courage. She demonstrated it once when she opened her American campaign with "Richard II," and she demonstrates it again with her production of "The Tempest" at the Alvin Theater. When less intrepid entrepreneurs screw up their courage for a round with the bard, they usually choose one of the old standby plays with a fool-proof plot, but Miss Webster scorns such half measures. She does a "Hamlet" or an "Othello" as a matter of course; she also determinedly plays what the timid would pronounce very nearly unplayable.

Some critics of "The Tempest" have always thought it feeble, and the rest have always been sure that it is very nearly ineffable. By their judgment it would seem therefore too bad or too good for the living theater, and until Miss Webster came along it has not, to the best of my memory, been done in New York since I saw it something like a quarter of a century ago. Now she not only puts it on but also puts it over, and does both because she uses the approach which has served her well in the past.

So far as I can make out, this approach might be defined in some such imperatives as the following: assume that the play, or at least some usable portion of it, is neither too delicate nor too dead for the requirements of a commercial theater; hire a cast which, in addition to being competent, includes members whose publicity value is by no means negligible; use any theatrical devices which will serve a purpose without caring too much whether they are or are not part of the Shakespearean tradition; don't worry too much about losing some of the "values" so long as you are sure that you have got some of the others. In this instance, as in the several previous ones, the result is exactly what I presume Miss Webster had hoped. A considerable portion of the public will be agreeably surprised to discover that "The Tempest" is more entertaining than it had been inclined to suppose. Shakespeare's more self-conscious admirers will grant as much as they ever grant to any modern performance of any of his works—namely, that it is well worth seeing, even though, of course, it does not do justice to a play which in all probability will never be done justice to.

It is with this latter view that I tend on the whole to agree. Arnold Moss is an acceptable Prospero, even though he is assigned a part which calls for more in the way of majestic bearing and majestic utterance than any actor can reasonably be expected to possess. Canada Lee makes a comically brutish Caliban, and Vera Zorina surprised me. In anticipation, a long-legged Ariel seemed almost as preposterous as a fat Hamlet, but besides capering very prettily, she gives the sprite a certain impressiveness, a certain dignity, which I had never supposed part of his character, but which, I must admit, is quite appropriate once one has seen it. George Vaskovec and Jan Werich, the Czech clowns, are sublime, and despite anything that others may say, I saw nothing to reprehend in the antics which made the Trinculo-Stephano scenes high points in the performance.

As one might expect, those purplest of purple patches, Prospero's two big speeches, are less impressive when delivered from the stage than they are when read to oneself, and I think the dislocation of the "we are such stuff as dreams are made on" passage is a serious mistake, since it makes it apply to the play as a whole, not, as it actually does, merely to the little divertissement staged by the magician for the entertainment of his guests. On the other hand, the half-mocking, half-tender scene between Ferdinand and Miranda came off very well indeed, and the important fact concerning the performance as a whole is the same as that which emerges from any reasonably competent performance of any of Shakespeare's plays—the fact, namely, that though certain incidents and certain lines seem less striking than they do when the play is read, certain others take on a significance which the reader is almost certain to miss. The answer to the old question whether Shakespeare belongs on the stage or in the study is simply "both."

As for the play as a whole, this performance confirmed my private conviction that it is neither merely feeble on the one hand nor on the other so much the wisest or profoundest of its author's works as to be very nearly beyond human comprehension. Prospero's farewell to his art really is, I am willing to believe, Shakespeare's farewell to his own. Caliban really is a playful embodiment of all the brutishness which Shakespeare, after the fashion of his time, thought typical of the mob in any society. Here on this desert island goodness does for once triumph easily and completely because here for once is a microcosm in which a perfectly good man is invested with absolute power. But "The Tempest" is a fantasy, not the solemn legacy of a statesman or a philosopher. Its famous serenity does not mean that its author had somehow reached a wisdom transcending "Hamlet" or "Lear." It means only that he was accustomed to assume a premise for any work of art and that, perhaps because he was in a happy mood, he chose for the nonce to assume, as one line in the play has it, "The seas threaten but they are merciful." To babble as some critics do of deeper wisdom and higher synthesis, to assert that "The Tempest" solemnly proclaims that God is in his heaven and all therefore right with the world, is to put Shakespeare somewhere below the level of Browning. It is to make him, as some critics seem determined to do, a forerunner of Mrs. Eddy.

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Like all Michael Todd's shows, "Up in Central Park" (New Century Theater) strikes the eye. It also, thanks to some pretty tunes by Sigmund Romberg, sometimes strikes the ear. Unfortunately, however, it never, to put it mildly, strikes the mind or even, very often, the funny bone.

Film Note

WHAT FILMS I will manage to discuss at anything like proper length when space next becomes available already puzzles me; I am snowed under by possibilities, some worthy, others quite as relevant through conspicuous unworthiness. For the time being I will say briefly that I enjoyed "On Approval," an English-made film with Beatrice Lillie and Clive Brook, so thoroughly that I have to fight off superlatives; that "Hangover Square" is a better than average horror picture up to, but not including, its wildly overloaded climax; that "A Song to Remember" contains a good deal of nicely played Chopin, and is as infuriating and funny a misrepresentation of an artist's life and work as I have ever seen; and that judging by "The Three Caballeros," a streak of cruelty which I have for years noticed in Walt Disney's productions is now certifiable. I should add fair warning about "On Approval": it is a studied, dead-pan, parodistic, late-Victorian setting of a Lonsdale drawing-room comedy, and practically every good thing about it is extremely specialized. A popular hostile synonym for that is "precious." Trivial as it is, I would be grateful for a lot more preciousness of the same sort; "On Approval" itself could use more.

JAMES AGEE

Music

B. H. HAGGIN

SERKIN'S illness caused a change of program at a New Friends of Music concert: instead of Busch and Serkin playing Mozart sonatas there were the Busch Chamber Players performing several works, of which I heard two: Bach's D minor Concerto for two violins, with Busch and Frances Magnes as the soloists; and Rameau's Troisième Concert. The Bach Concerto was performed with Busch and Magnes standing in front of the orchestra and facing the audience—which might have worked if there had been enough rehearsal for soloists and orchestra to achieve an understanding about tempos and ensemble; but actually a performance which sounded as though it had not been rehearsed was not even held together by a conductor; and in addition there were technical defects in Busch's playing, of which Magnes's was free. On the other hand, for the Rameau piece Busch seated himself at the head of the first violins, where he led what was evidently—from the beauty of sound and precision and finish—a long-rehearsed performance of a delightful work.

At another concert the New Friends, finding that a program of Mozart's Quartets K. 428 and 590 and Debussy's Cello Sonata was a little short, filled the fifteen or twenty minutes with a First Cello Sonata by Jean Huré—fifteen or twenty minutes too much of the polished inanity that is one vein of modern French music. Debussy's Sonata, for me, was only the expertly contrived motions of saying something that wasn't really said; Schuster's playing of it was masterly in its refinement of tone and style. And that reminds me of a recent Sunday afternoon when I walked into a living room where the radio was turned on for the Philharmonic broadcast of Dvorak's Cello Concerto with Leonard Rose as the soloist, and I heard cello-playing that was astounding in its beauty of tone, its ease and fluidity all the way to the extremes of the instrument's range. Even Feuermann's playing, as I recall it, is surpassed by Rose's in these respects—which are all that I would venture to talk about after a hearing of only a movement of Dvorak's Concerto.

The Budapest Quartet's performances of the two Mozart quartets were unequal, as its performances are these days. Fatigued after Lehmann's third recital, and poisoned by the air of the unventilated hall, I was half-asleep during K. 428; but my guest, who has experienced ears for quartet-playing, told me not to worry—I had missed a performance which sounded as though they hadn't rehearsed or had had a fight that morning. On the other hand the performance of K. 590, for which I was wide awake, was fully up to Budapest standard. At the Y. M. H. A. too the group's playing has reached heights in certain of Beethoven's quartets—Opus 135, and above all Opus 132—which it has not reached in others. And the Budapest Quartet reminds me of Alexander Schneider's Albeneri Trio: the pallid tone which its pianist produced in Ravel's Trio turned out to represent not an adaptation to Ravel's music but a French style of piano-playing that produced the same tone in Beethoven.

As for Lehmann, it appears that she holds a lot in reserve for the occasions when she decides to use it. What she saved in volume of tone and emotional intensity at her first recital she expended in her wonderful singing and acting of the songs of Wolf and Strauss at the third. And so I dare say she will have enough for her great performance of the Princess in "Der Rosenkavalier" later in the month.

Columbia's February list is headed by a set (556; $5.50) of Beethoven's Quartet Opus 18 No. 5 performed by the Budapest Quartet. The work has no searching and profound slow movement; its serious moments are those of a somewhat impassioned first movement, a wistful and lovely minuet movement; and for the rest there are a light-footed and charming second movement in triple time and a high-spirited finale. The performance, recorded before the Petrillo ban by the Roisman-Schneider-Kroyt-Schneider group, is excellent; its recorded sound is hard and cold, but at least without the harshness and coarseness and break-ups of other Columbia reproductions of Budapest performances.

Columbia's only other new release is a three-volume set (554; $18.50) of Shakespeare's—not Verdi's—"Othello," as performed by Paul Robeson, José Ferrer, Uta Hagen and their supporting company. It is not in my province; but I can say that whereas I know that the lines of "Richard II" which Maurice Evans speaks are poetry I don't know this about the lines of "Othello" as Robeson speaks them. And I can report that the reproduction of the voices is sometimes unclear near the center of the record.

For the rest Columbia features two older sets from its catalogue. One (X-157; $2.50) offers the delightful Boccherini music that Françaix arranged and scored with excellent taste for the ballet "Scuola di Ballo," beautifully performed by the London Philharmonic under Dorati, and beautifully recorded. The other (313; $4.50) offers Grieg's Piano Concerto, excellently performed by Gieseking with a moderately good accompaniment by the Berlin State Opera Orchestra under Rosbaud. The recorded sound is good; but there is some wavering of pitch in my review copy, and its surfaces are noisy.

BUY BONDS

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Letters to the Editors

Wanted: Horse Sense

Dear Sirs: Every time I see opinions in your journal that speak of good balance and impartial appraisal, your stock goes up with me. I refer particularly to your criticism of the dictatorial practices of James Petrillo.

Not all business men are anti-labor by any means. A larger and larger percentage of them are understanding that better and more regular wages are the means of providing the purchasing power necessary to prevent over-production in normal times. This is one of the major selling projects we need to undertake in our country, but it has to be undertaken sensibly. We shouldn't try to attain a 50 per cent increase in the minimum wage in one jump—and we shouldn't guarantee the minimum wage to everyone, because the higher the minimum goes, the more encouragement for loafing. That temptation should be removed.

Wisconsin had a good policy before NRA. Its program worked well without a lot of expensive supervision and at the same time led to fair piece rates. The practice was something like this: where people were employed at hourly rates, there was to be no argument, the minimum had to be paid; but where people were employed at direct piece rates, the minimum had to be high enough so that 75 per cent of the workers could earn the minimum or more; the remaining 25 per cent tolerance was intended for learners, handicapped workers, the aged, those who fell below par, and those who preferred to loaf.

It provided a natural incentive for productivity—and American progress is based on productivity, not on the principle of getting something for nothing.

We belong to the small-business crowd. We are not anxious to get any handouts from Uncle Sam. We are only interested in fair rules and regulations —rules that curb monopoly and prevent it from operating with all kinds of privileges and advantages. We know what kind of a squeeze monopolistic business can put on an ordinary enterprise. If with fair rules we can't hold our own, I for one would want to step aside and let someone else try to head our business.

But to me it seems that labor is mimicking monopolistic business far too much when it yields to men like Petrillo, when it supports a wage principle that encourages the slow-down practices that have been so prevalent in recent months and years, and when it further encourages the principle of trying to get something for nothing.

What is needed so much today is just common, ordinary horse sense with fair play under statesman-like leadership on the part of business, labor, agriculture, and government. After all, we have common interests. Why can't we start working together instead of constantly fighting each other—and why can't a journal like yours lead with that kind of leadership? C. T. HABEGGER.

Berne Manufacturing Company
Berne, Ind., December 29

The Political Score

Dear Sirs: I read *The Nation* carefully each week, as I always have. I read it expecting to find hard-hitting liberal journalism, a courageous lashing at idols and vested interests. But instead I have been getting a kind of fuzziness, a moral and intellectual wishful thinking, that borders on cowardice. Certainly in the kaleidoscope of contemporary politics it is often necessary to urge certain compromises of detail; *but only from within the framework of a consistent position.* You have no such position. Or at least I have been unable to discover it. It is no longer possible just to be against fascism, any more than it was ever possible just to be against war. There must be a why and a how. I wish sometime the editors of *The Nation* would stop to figure them out.

If I have any right at all to criticize, it is only because I have read and supported your magazine for many years, but I suggest that at this time one must be either for or against the political forces controlling the peace. Assuming the latter position, it is still both wise and possible to *bargain* with these forces—but only from an unmistakably independent stand. Your present criticism of Churchill, for instance, is meaningless in the context of your generally acquiescent policy for the last six months. Your fairly uncritical support of the President during the election incriminates you, to that degree, in his present cynical amorality. Your willingness to publish a Soviet apologist like Anna Louise Strong involves you in at least a partial indorsement of Russian imperial ambitions. I insist that much irresponsible confusion results from your refusal to face the political facts of life with a realistic but principled attitude and philosophy. Perhaps it is unfair to put my objections on an almost ethical —rather than a purely intellectual— basis, but that is precisely the way I feel about it.

No better example of what I mean could be found than a sentence from your editorial of December 16. You said: ". . . in Italy the new Bonomi government, *minus Sforza and the Socialists but including the Communist leader, Togliatti,* will provide a temporary compromise" (italics mine). But this is no compromise. This is the basic pattern as designed by Stalin and Churchill, and tolerated, if not actively approved, by President Roosevelt—a new partnership between reactionary right and totalitarian left, omitting the only ones who might give us a free Europe. Is there

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

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Crossword Puzzle No. 102

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Long-suffering people whose lot was often a hot stake or a cold chop
5 Ah, satin from Africa
9 Cleanse again
10 The "Merchant of Venice"
11 Decline
13 Largest boat carried by a man-o'-war
15 Chemical element
16 Author of *Wee Willie Winkie*
17 English Shakespearean actor (1853-1917)
19 Hit-and-run political ammunition
20 "And an echo arose from the suicide's grave, 'Oh willow, ---------, ---------!'"
21 Insect a king loved so well he ordered trousers made for it
23 Early Western character, first name "Wyatt"
26 Gazing
28 Is full of holes yet demands an answer. That's a conundrum!
29 A what-d'ye-call-it
30 As snug as a bug in a rug (hidden)
32 "Angered" is its anagram and synonym
33 He of the smile that was childlike and bland
34 "Cheered himself up with the ------- of philosophers"
35 Last thing an artist usually does to a picture (two words, 5 and 2)

DOWN

1 Definitely a killjoy, from the conspirators' point of view
2 "Oh joy, oh -------, I am it; Excuse me while I throw a fit"
3 A fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy, according to Hamlet
4 The pintail-duck
5 Biblical king killed by a bow drawn at a venture
6 An overheated andiron is edible (two words, 3 and 3)
7 China's southern capital
8 Clothes pressers
12 Herbert Spencer said that proficiency at this game was evidence of a misspent youth
14 One of an ancient people of Northern Syria
15 The bare idea
18 A letter that is Greek even to the Greeks
19 We appear to be looking both ways at once
21 They don't make good money
22 Father William, in the eyes of the youth, was this
24 North African city founded by the Arabs in 935
25 The answer is in the infirmary
26 "On, gals!" might be the war cry
27 Staring
30 Puts two and two together
31 After John

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 101

ACROSS:—1 CORPORAL; 6 PUSH; 10 OPTIC; 11 COY; 12 SERIO; 13 EARNED; 16 PADDED; 17 TENNIEL; 18 CAGE; 20 RAIN; 22 DOORMAT; 23 SAND; 24 MOOR; 25 PEA SOUP; 27 BOWLED; 29 SOLING; 34 OWN UP; 35 ONE; 36 INERT; 37 WERE; 38 EGG-SHELL.

DOWN:—OUTER; 3 PACKET; 4 RUCK; 5 LAYS; 6 POSTAL; 7 SHRED; 8 TOVE; 9 LONDONER; 14 DEPOSED; 15 INGRESS; 16 PEGASUS; 18 CASH BOOK; 19 GUN; 21 AGO; 25 PEOPLE; 26 POLISH; 28 WINCE; 30 IDEAL; 31 GO-TO; 32 TOPE; 33 BERG.

enough reminiscent radicalism left in the editors of *The Nation* to make them lose a few hours of collective sleep over the fact that throughout the world those Socialists who managed to escape fascism are now being systematically destroyed by Stalin with the help of Churchill and probably Roosevelt? Doesn't it make you wonder whose side you are actually on? Your puny N. C.-P. A. C. prefers not to see these things, but you at least could take the heroic stand you have so often been capable of. For a magazine that once knew the political score, there has been a sad falling from grace in the pages of *The Nation*. This reader, for one, would like to understand why. OLGA COREY

Yellow Springs, Ohio, December 28

Strange

Dear Sirs: I'm no expert on opinion polls, but I do know that when my friends and I passed the big Gallup poll display in the window of the Washington *Post* building here in Washington two weeks before election, we marveled at the figures which showed Dewey ahead of Roosevelt, and —this is the truth—we all prophesied that in the final figures, which were to be released by Mr. Gallup's organization the day before election, Mr. Roosevelt would be far ahead of Mr. Dewey.

And so it was. But for two whole weeks before November 6, with countless people trying to make up their minds, the Gallup poll was telling the country that Dewey had the best of it. It's mighty strange! HOWARD KEATS

Arlington, Va., January 2

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